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THE CASE AGAI ST THE GOLDSTO E REPORT: A STUDY I  EVIDE TIARY BIAS 
BY ALA  DERSHOWITZ
1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Goldstone Report, when read in full and in context, is much worse than most of its 
detractors (and supporters) believe.  It is far more accusatory of Israel, far less balanced 
in its criticism of Hamas, far less honest in its evaluation of the evidence, far less 
responsible in drawing its conclusion, far more biased against Israeli than Palestinian 
witnesses, and far more willing to draw adverse inferences of intentionality from Israeli 
conduct and statements than from comparable Palestinian conduct and statements.  It is 
worse than any report previously prepared by any other United Nations agency or human 
rights group.  As Major General Avichai Mandelblit, the advocate general of the Israeli 
Defense Forces, aptly put it: 
 
“I have read every report, from Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the 
Arab League.  We ourselves set up investigations into 140 complaints.  It is when 
you read these other reports and complaints that you realize how truly vicious the 
Goldstone report is.  He made it look like we set out to go after the economic 
infrastructure and civilians, that it was intentional:  It’s a vicious lie.”
2 
 
The Goldstone report is, to any fair reader, a shoddy piece of work, unworthy of serious 
consideration by people of good will, committed to the truth. 
 
Most of the criticism and praise of the report has been based on its highly publicized and 
controversial conclusions, rather than on its methodology, analysis and substantive 
findings.  The one statement Richard Goldstone has made, with which I agree, is that 
many of the report’s most strident critics have probably not read the entire report.  But it 
is also true, though I have not heard the report’s biased author say this, that many of the 
report’s most vocal defenders and advocates have also not read it.   
 
It is not surprising that so few of the report’s critics and supporters have actually made 
their way through its dense and repetitive texts.  The version I originally read was 553 
pages long plus appendices.  There are 1223 footnotes, though many of its most critical 
statements are not well sourced.  It is poorly written, obviously drafted by several 
different hands and without the benefit of a good overall editor.  It is laden with internal 
inconsistencies, shoddy citations of authority, and overall poor craftsmanship.  If a camel 
is a horse designed by a committee, this report lacks even the grace of a dromedary.  
Most of the commentary on the report, both pro and con, seems to be based on its 
somewhat sanitized summary and conclusion.  Some of the worst mistakes are buried 
very deep in the report, many of the most serious ones toward the end. 
 
                                                 
1 The author wishes to express great appreciation to Josh Sharp, who provided excellent research for this 
paper.   
2 Ethan Bronner, Israel Poised to Challenge a U. . Report on Gaza, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 23, 2010, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/24/world/middleeast/24goldstone.html.  
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Efforts are currently underway by supporters of the report to have governments, 
prosecutors, non governmental organizations, religious groups and distinguished 
individuals sign on to the report, so as to give it the credibility it now lacks.  No one 
should do so without reading the report in full—and without reading responsible 
criticisms (and defenses) of the report.  I have read every word of the report and 
compared different sections.  I have offered to debate Goldstone about its contents.  He 
has refused, as he has generally refused to respond substantively to credible critics of the 
report.  My offer to debate still stands.  If he refuses, as I expect he will, let him at least 
respond to the serious legal, factual and moral criticisms contained in this study and 
others.
3  As the head of the mission and the report’s most visible public defender, 
Goldstone has a public obligation to respond to responsible criticism, which to date, he 
has not done.   
 
In the coming week, the Secretary General of the United Nations will present a 
compilation of responses to the Goldstone Report.
4  I am submitting this analysis for 
inclusion. 
 
The Israeli military will soon publish a detailed rebuttal to the Goldstone Report, 
providing photographic and other hard evidence that contradicts its most serious 
“findings.”  I am not in a position to deal with specific military issues.  But I am in a 
position to consider and evaluate the evidentiary methodology employed by the 
Goldstone Report.    
 
In this analysis, I will focus on the two central conclusions reached in the report.  The 
first is that the real purpose of Operation Cast Lead was not to protect Israeli civilians 
from Hamas rockets, over eight thousand of which had struck Israel over a nine year 
period.
5  According to the report, Israel used the rocket attacks on its citizens as a pretext, 
an excuse, a cover for the real purpose of the operation, which was to target innocent 
Palestinian civilians—children, women, the elderly—for death.  This criminal objective 
was explicitly decided upon by the highest levels of the Israeli government and military 
and constitutes a deliberate and willful war crime.  The report found these serious charges 
“to be firmly based in fact” and had “no doubt” of their truth.
6 
                                                 
3 Goldstone has said, “I have yet to hear from the Obama administration what the flaws in the report that 
they have identified are.  I would be happy to respond to them, if and when I know what they are.”  
Goldstone Tells Obama: Show Me Flaws in Gaza Report, HAARETZ, Nov. 22, 2009, available at 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1122893.html.   Yet Goldstone has repeatedly failed to respond to 
substantive criticism of the report. The Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America 
wrote Justice Goldstone a thoughtful letter containing substantive critiques and pointing out the report’s 
flaws.  A lengthy study of the report was attached.  Here is how Goldstone responded: “I confirm receipt of 
your letter. I have no intention of responding to your open letter.”  A Formal Letter to Justice Goldstone, 
available at http://www.camera.org/index.asp?x_context=7&x_issue=76&x_article=1764 . 
4 Israel Official Reply on Goldstone Gaza Report: Probe Biased, Flawed, HAARETZ, Jan. 24, 2009, 
available at http://haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1144596.html. 
5 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ROCKETS FROM GAZA 20 (Aug. 2009), available at  
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ioptqassam0809web.pdf. 
6 U.N. Human Rights Council, Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, Human Rights in Palestine and 
Other Occupied Arab Territories, ¶¶ 1884, 1895, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 25, 2009) [hereinafter 
Goldstone Report].  
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In contrast, the Mission decided that Hamas was not guilty of deliberately and willfully 
using the civilian population as human shields.  It found “no evidence” that Hamas 
fighters “engaged in combat in civilian dress,” “no evidence” that “Palestinian 
combatants mingled with the civilian population with the intention of shielding 
themselves from attack,” and no support for the claim that mosques were used to store 
weapons.
 7 
 
As we will see, the report is demonstrably wrong about both of these critical conclusions.  
The hard evidence conclusively proves that the exact opposite is true, namely that: 
 
1.  Israel did not have a policy of targeting innocent civilians for death.  Indeed 
the IDF went to unprecedented lengths to minimize civilian casualties; and 
 
2.  That Hamas did have a deliberate policy of having its combatants dress in 
civilian clothing, fire their rockets from densely populated areas, use civilians 
as human shields, and store weapons in mosques.  
 
What is even more telling than its erroneous conclusions, however, is its deliberately 
skewed methodology,
8 particularly the manner in which it used and evaluated similar 
evidence very differently, depending on whether it favored the Hamas or Israeli side. 
 
The evidentiary bias of the report should come as no surprise to anyone who is familiar 
with the members of the Mission and statements they have made both before, during and 
after working on the report.
9  There were four members: A Pakistani woman, who was 
formerly Special Representative of the Secretary General on Human Rights Defenders; 
an Irish man, who was formerly a Colonel in the Irish Defense Forces; a British woman, 
who is a professor at the London School of Economics; and a South African man, the 
former Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  
 
                                                 
7 Goldstone Report  ¶¶ 495, 483, 486. 
8 As a preliminary example of the Mission’s skewed methodology, the Mission fails to verify the claims of 
Palestinian witnesses.  For instance, Armr Hamad told the Mission, “The industrial sector that was 
destroyed, for example, the 324 factories that were destroyed, that we[re] destroyed used to employ four 
hundred thous , uh, 40,000 workers. And these have lost their uh, jobs, uh, forever.”  The witness based his 
testimony on a report that noted that only 4,000 workers lost their job, but the Mission blindly wrote, “Mr. 
Amr Hamad indicated that 324 factories had been destroyed during the Israeli military 
operations at a cost of 40,000 jobs.”  See Richard Landes, Goldstone’s Gaza Report: Part I, MIDDLE EAST 
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Dec. 2009, available at http://www.gloria 
center.org/meria/2009/12/landes1.html#_edn51 [hereinafter Goldstone’s Gaza Report: Part I]. 
9 It should also come as no surprise to anyone familiar with the workings of the United Nations Human 
Rights Council.  By the time the UNHRC was only three years old, it had condemned Israel 26 times and 
all other nations 6 times total.  Israel is the only country that is permanently on the agenda of the UNHRC.  
Richard Landes, Goldstone’s Gaza Report: Part II, MIDDLE EAST REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 
Dec. 2009, available at http://www.gloria center.org/meria/2009/12/landes1.html#_edn51 [hereinafter 
Goldstone’s Gaza Report: Part II].  
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The Pakistani member of the Mission, Hina Jilani, signed a letter (along with two other 
Mission members) before even being appointed stating that “The events in Gaza have 
shocked us to the core.”
10  After the report was completed, she made statements 
indicating that victims must not only be listened to, but that it would be “very cruel to not 
give credence to their voices.”
11  She did not mention that the “voices” of the Gaza 
witnesses were monitored and controlled by Hamas, since their testimony was televised, 
and that much of it was demonstrably false and contradicted by hard evidence. 
The Irish member of the Mission, Col. Desmond Travers, refused to believe evidence that 
undercut Hamas’ position even when it was on videotape and utterly uncontradicted.  
This is what he said about weapons being stored in Gaza mosques: “We also found no 
evidence that mosques were used to store munitions.  Those charges reflect Western 
perceptions in some quarters that Islam is a violent religion….If I were a Hamas 
operative the last place I’d store munitions would be in a mosque.  It’s not secure, is very 
visible, and would probably be pre targeted by Israeli surveillance.  There are a [sic] 
many better places to store munitions.”
12  Not only is there physical evidence that 
conclusively proves that mosques are a favorite place to store rockets and other weapons, 
but Hamas leaders boast of it.   
 
The British member, Christine Chinkin, had already decided the case before hearing one 
bit of evidence.  Here is what she said in a letter that bore her signature written before she 
was even appointed to the Mission: “The rocket attacks on Israel by Hamas deplorable as 
they are, do not, in terms of scale and effect amount to an armed attack entitling Israel to 
rely on self defence…. The killing of almost 800 Palestinians, mostly civilians, and more 
than 3,000 injuries, accompanied by the destruction of schools, mosques, houses, UN 
compounds and government buildings, which Israel has a responsibility to protect under 
the Fourth Geneva Convention, is not commensurate to the deaths caused by Hamas 
rocket fire….Israel’s actions amount to aggression, not self defence, not least because its 
assault on Gaza was unnecessary….As things stand, its invasion and bombardment of 
Gaza amounts to collective punishment of Gaza’s 1.5m inhabitants contrary to 
international humanitarian and human rights law…. [T]he manner and scale of its 
[Israel’s] operations in Gaza amount to an act of aggression and is contrary to 
international law, notwithstanding the rocket attacks by Hamas.”
13  Here is the curious 
manner in which Goldstone responded to claims Chinkin was biased: “This is not a 
judicial inquiry.  If it had been a judicial inquiry, that letter she’d signed would have been 
                                                 
10  Gaza Investigators Call for War Crimes Inquiry, Amnesty International, Mar. 16, 2009, available at 
http://www.amnesty.org.au/news/comments/20572/. 
11See Haroon Siddiqui, Looking for Accountability over Gaza War, THE STAR, Oct. 15, 2009, available at 
http://www.thestar.com/comment/article/710335 (“I think it was a very ill considered move on his 
[Abbas’s] part [to shelve the Goldstone Report]. I’ve been in Gaza.  I’ve met the victims, as I’ve met the 
victims from southern Israel of rocket attacks from Hamas and other groups.  And I know what the victims’ 
expectations are.  I think it’d be very cruel to not give credence to their voices.”). 
12 Ken Silverstein, Six Questions for Desmond Travers on the Goldstone Report, HARPER’S, Oct. 29, 2009, 
available at http://www.harpers.org/archive/2009/10/hbc 90006003. 
13 Israel’s Bombardment of Gaza is  ot Self Defence – It’s a War Crime, SUNDAY TIMES, Jan. 11, 2009,  
available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/letters/article5488380.ece.  
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a ground for disqualification.”
14  If her bias would have been a ground for judicial 
disqualification, then surely her conclusions should not be credited by quasi judicial 
bodies, such as the International Criminal Court, the U.N. Council on Human Rights and 
other governmental and non governmental bodies.   
 
Finally, the South African member, Richard Goldstone, insisted that the hearings in Gaza 
be televised, thereby assuring that all witnesses had to tow the Hamas party line or risk 
certain death.  Goldstone also lied about the role Hamas played in escorting and 
presenting evidence to the Mission.  Here is what Goldstone wrote about being escorted 
by Hamas: “I must, however, categorically deny the allegation that Hamas officials 
accompanied Members of the Fact Finding Mission at all, let alone ‘at every stage of 
their visit to Gaza.’  Reports to that effect are denial of truth, as I have already publically 
stated.  I would have found this to be quite unacceptable.”
15  The actual truth is quite 
different.  According to an Associated Press article published on June 9, 2009, “Hamas 
security often accompanied his [Goldstone’s] team during their five day trip to Gaza last 
week, raising questions about the ability of witnesses to freely describe the militant 
group’s actions.”
16  
 
How could Goldstone possibly know who among those escorting him were affiliated with 
Hamas?  The reality is that nothing significant takes place in Gaza without the approval 
of Hamas. 
 
Richard Goldstone has acknowledged that he accepted the role of Chairman with a clear 
preconceived agenda.
 17  He has told numerous Jewish friends and acquaintances that he 
agreed to take on the task in order to “help Israel.”  He believed that he would bring 
“balance” to the report.  Whether his real motive was to help Israel or to accomplish 
some other goal, it is always disqualifying to come to a quasi judicial fact finding 
function with a preconceived agenda.  Sometimes it causes one to lean over backwards, 
sometimes forwards.  But leaning in either direction is inconsistent with objectivity. 
 
II. GOLDSTONE: ISRAEL INTENTIONALLY KILLS INNOCENT CIVILIANS   
 
I begin with the Mission’s most irresponsible criticism of Israel.  At bottom the report 
accuses the Jewish state of having implemented a policy in Gaza that borders on 
genocide.  It blames the civilian deaths that occurred during Operation Cast Lead not on 
                                                 
14 Goldstone Walks a Fine Line in an Ancient War Zone, BUSINESS DAY (South Africa), Apr. 8, 2009, 
available at http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=77618. 
15 Letter from Justice Richard Goldstone to Ambassador  Leshno Yaar (July 17, 2009), available in the 
appendix to the Goldstone Report. 
16 Ben Hubbard, U 's Gaza War Crimes Investigation Faces Obstacles, Associated Press Wire, June 9, 
2009, available via the AP Archive at  http://www.aparchive.com/. The AP has not retracted its statement, 
nor has Goldstone explicitly challenged it. 
17 Several other well known people, with a long history of antagonism to Israel, were originally asked to 
serve on the mission.  They all declined.  Mary Robinson, whose bias against Israel has been deep and 
longstanding, gave the following reason for declining the assignment: “[U]nfortunately, the Human Rights 
Council passed a resolution seeking a fact finding mission to only look at what Israel had done, and I don’t 
think that’s a human rights approach.”  Quoted in Why Mary Robinson Rejected the Mandate Accepted by 
Judge Goldstone, U.N. Watch, available at http://blog.unwatch.org/?p=405.  
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the fog of war, not on the use of human shields by Hamas, not on the inevitability of 
civilian casualties when rockets are fired from densely populated urban areas, not even on 
the use of “disproportionate force” by Israel.  Instead it blames the Palestinian civilian 
deaths on an explicit policy devised at the highest levels of the Israeli government and 
military, of killing as many Palestinian civilians as possible.  It concludes that Operation 
Cast Lead was not designed to stop the rocket attacks on Israel’s civilians—more than 
eight thousand over a nine year period.
18  Instead, the rocket attacks merely served as an 
excuse for the Israeli military to achieve its real purpose: namely the killing of Palestinian 
civilians.  Lest there be any doubt that this is the accusation being made, read the words 
of the report itself: 
 
“While the Israeli Government has sought to portray its operations as essentially a 
response to rocket attacks in the exercise of its right to self defence, the Mission 
considers the plan to have been directed, at least in part, at a different target: the 
people of Gaza as a whole.”
19 
 
At other points in the report, the language “at least in part” is dropped.  Instead the report 
concludes that Israel’s “overall policy [was] aimed at punishing the Gaza population” and 
that its “force [was] aimed not at the enemy,” but at “the civilian population.”
20  It found 
that Israel was guilty of “the direct targeting and arbitrary killing of Palestinian civilians” 
and that the killings “are the result of deliberate planning and policy decisions.”
21  “[T]he 
Mission finds that the incident and patterns of events that are considered in this report 
have resulted from deliberate planning and policy decisions throughout the chain of 
command, down to the standard operating procedures and instructions given to the troops 
on the ground.”
22  “[I]n every case the Israeli armed forces had carried out direct 
intentional strikes against civilians,” and the report considered that “the civilian 
population as such” was “the object of attacks,” rather than the collateral victims of 
military actions directed against combatants.
23 
 
These are among the most serious charges ever leveled by a United Nations organization 
against a member state.  It accuses Israel of using Hamas rocket attacks against its 
civilians as an excuse—a cover—for a carefully planned and executed policy of 
deliberately targeting innocent civilians for mass murder.  As philosophy professor 
Moshe Halbertal, a strong peace advocate and frequent critic of Israeli military actions 
(including during Operation Cast Lead), put it:   
 
“Now, there is a huge moral difference between the accusation that Israel did not 
do enough to minimize collateral civilian death and the claim that Israel targeted 
civilians intentionally.  It might well be that Israel should have done more than it 
did to minimize collateral deaths—it is a harsh enough claim, and it deserves a 
                                                 
18 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ROCKETS FROM GAZA 20 (Aug. 2009), available at  
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ioptqassam0809web.pdf. 
19 Goldstone Report  ¶ 1883.  (emphasis added) 
20 Id. ¶¶ 1884, 1886. 
21 Id. ¶¶ 816, 61. 
22 Id. ¶ 1191. 
23 Id.  ¶¶ 810, 841.  
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thorough examination.  But the claim that Israel intentionally targeted civilians as 
a policy of war is false and slanderous.”
24 
 
Even Israel’s most vociferous domestic critics—The Public Committee Against Torture 
in Israel and B’Tselem—acknowledge that “Israel did not have a policy of intentionally 
killing civilians….”
25  Jessica Montell, Executive Director of B’Tselem, wrote, “I was 
disturbed by the framing of Israel’s military operation as part of ‘an overall policy aimed 
at punishing the Gaza population for its resilience.’  The facts presented in the report 
itself would not seem to support such a far reaching conclusion.”
26  While condemning 
the operation as disproportionate, or worse, these organizations did not cross the “huge 
moral” line—the line irresponsibly and mendaciously crossed by the Goldstone Report—
of accusing Israel of intentionally targeting civilians for death.  As the New York Times 
reported: 
 
“[V]irtually no one in Israel, including the leaders of Breaking the Silence and the 
human rights group B’Tselem, thinks that the Goldstone accusation of an assault 
on civilians is correct.  ‘I do not accept the Goldstone conclusion of a systematic 
attack of civilian infrastructure,’ said Yael Stein, research director of B’Tselem.  
‘It is not convincing.’”
27 
 
One would expect that before making so serious and unprecedented a charge, the report 
would present overwhelming direct evidence of such a policy.  Israel is, after all, an open 
society with an aggressive investigative media, a strong independent judiciary, many 
dissenting voices, vigorous opposition parties, a vibrant peace movement and few secrets.  
Yet the report presents absolutely no hard evidence to support its serious accusations of a 
governmental policy of deliberately maximizing civilian deaths.   
 
Indeed, much of the evidence cited in the report proves precisely the opposite—that 
Israel’s policy was to minimize civilian deaths, while attacking those responsible for 
targeting Israeli civilians with rocket attacks.  Moreover, it ignores massive amounts of 
evidence—some specifically offered to it, other publicly available in open sources—that 
prove beyond any doubt that the central conclusions of the report are demonstrably false.   
 
Goldstone has himself acknowledged that there is no actual “evidence” that the report’s 
conclusions are correct.  Indeed, he has gone even further and admitted that “If this was a 
court of law, there would have been nothing proven.”  He has also said he would not be 
embarrassed “if many of the allegations turn out to be disproved”
 28—as it appears likely 
                                                 
24 Moshe Halbertal, The Goldstone Illusion, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 6, 2009, available at 
http://www.tnr.com/article/world/the goldstone illusion?page=0,5 [hereinafter The Goldstone Illusion]. 
25 THE PUBLIC COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE IN ISRAEL, NO SECOND THOUGHTS 29 (Nov. 2009), available 
at http://www.stoptorture.org.il/files/no%20second%20thoughts_ENG_WEB.pdf.  
26 Jessica Montell, The Goldstone Report on Gaza, HUFFINGTONPOST.COM, Oct. 1, 2009, available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jessica montell/the goldstone report on g_b_306500.html. 
27 Ethan Bronner, Israel Poised to Challenge a U. . Report on Gaza, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 23, 2010, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/24/world/middleeast/24goldstone.html. 
28 Gal Beckerman, Goldstone: ‘If This Was a Court Of Law, There Would Have Been  othing Proven’, 
THE FORWARD, Oct. 16, 2009, available at http://www.forward.com/articles/116269/.  
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they will be, by photographic and other hard evidence.
29  Yet Israel’s enemies cite the 
report as if it proved its charges beyond all doubt.  That is because the report itself is 
written so as to suggest, quite falsely, that it had proved its case.  For example:  
 
“The Mission considers this position [“The operations were in furtherance of an 
overall policy aimed at punishing the Gaza population….”] to be firmly based in 
fact….”
31 
 
“[T]he systematic and deliberate nature of the activities described in this report 
leave the Mission in no doubt that responsibility lies in the first place with those 
who designed, planned, ordered and oversaw the operations.”
32 
 
The reality is that the report’s central conclusions—that Israel’s policy was to maximize 
the deaths of civilians—is not “firmly based in fact.”  It is made up of whole cloth and 
contradicted by the evidence purportedly relied on by those who wrote the report.  
Moreover, it is disproved by public record evidence deliberately ignored by the report.
33 
                                                 
29 Ethan Bronner, Israel Poised to Challenge a U. . Report on Gaza, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 23, 2010, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/24/world/middleeast/24goldstone.html. 
31 Goldstone Report ¶ 1884. 
32 Id. ¶ 1895.  According to The Forward: 
“…the report itself is replete with bold and declarative legal conclusions seemingly at odds with 
the cautious and conditional explanations of its author.  The report repeatedly refers, without 
qualification, to specific violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention committed by Israel and 
other breaches of international law.  Citing particular cases, the report determines unequivocally 
that Israel ‘violated the prohibition under customary international law’ against targeting civilians.  
These violations, it declares, ‘constitute a grave breach’ of the convention.”   
Gal Beckerman, Goldstone: ‘If This Was a Court Of Law, There Would Have Been  othing Proven’, THE 
FORWARD, Oct. 16, 2009, available at http://www.forward.com/articles/116269/. 
Goldstone’s claim that he “wouldn’t consider it in any way embarrassing if many of the allegations turn out 
to be disproved,” seems disingenuous, because Goldstone has put his imprimatur—and his reputation—
behind the reports’ conclusions.  The only reason anyone is paying any attention to yet another of the serial 
condemnatory reports by the United Nations Human Rights Council is  because Richard Goldstone—a 
“distinguished” Jew—allegedly wrote it and signed on to its conclusions.  If he really doesn’t stand by its 
conclusions—if he doesn’t care one way or another whether they are true or false, proven or unproven—
then no extra weight should be given to its findings or conclusions because of the “distinguished” 
reputation of its Jewish chairman.  See Alan Dershowitz, Ad Hominem Attack on Israel, 
HUFFINGTONPOST.COM, Sept. 24, 2009, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alan dershowitz/ad 
hominem attack on isra_b_298681.html.  But weight is being given to some of its “unproven” and 
uninvestigated allegations which Goldstone admits may be wrong.  There have been calls for boycotts, 
divestments, war crime prosecutions and other forms of condemnation based on the conclusions reached by 
the report.   
33 Goldstone’s content and tone varies, depending on his audience.  When talking to largely Jewish 
audiences he minimizes the findings of the report, but when talking to other audiences, he maximizes them.  
Contrast his statement to The Forward, “And I wouldn’t consider it in any way embarrassing if many of the 
allegations [in the report] turn out to be disproved” with what he told the Human Rights Council, “[W]e 
detail a number of specific incidents in which Israeli forces launched direct attacks against civilians with 
lethal consequences. These were, with only one exception, where the facts establish that there was no 
military objective or advantage that could justify the attacks.” Gal Beckerman, Goldstone: ‘If This Was a 
Court Of Law, There Would Have Been  othing Proven’, THE FORWARD, Oct. 16, 2009, available at 
http://www.forward.com/articles/116269/; Justice Richard Goldstone,  Remarks before the U.N. Human 
Rights Council (prepared version) (Sept. 29, 2009), available at  
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The report relies on five categories of evidence that purport to prove that Israel’s true 
intention was not to defend its civilians against Hamas rocket attacks, but rather to 
maximize the deaths of innocent Palestinian civilians.  These categories are: statements 
of military leaders; statements of political officials; the nature of Israeli weaponry; the 
number of civilian casualties; and the fact that the IDF deliberately attacked food supplies 
and non human civilian targets, such as a wastewater plant.   
 
The first category consists of statements—generally quoted with little or no context—
made by Israeli military leaders before the beginning of Operation Cast Lead.  These 
include the following:   
 
“In its operations in southern Lebanon in 2006, there emerged from Israeli 
military thinking a concept known as the Dahiya doctrine, as a result of the 
approach taken to the Beirut neighborhood of that name.  Major General Gadi 
Eisenkot, the Israeli Northern Command chief, expressed the premise of the 
doctrine: 
 
What happened in the Dahiya quarter of Beirut in 2006 will happen in 
every village from which Israel is fired on. […] We will apply 
disproportionate force on it and cause great damage and destruction there. 
From our standpoint, these are not civilian villages, they are military 
bases. […] This is not a recommendation. This is a plan. And it has been 
approved.” 
 
“After the war in southern Lebanon in 2006, a number of senior former military 
figures appeared to develop the thinking that underlay the strategy set out by Gen. 
Eiskenot. In particular Major General (Ret.) Giora Eiland has argued that, in the 
event of another war with Hizbullah, the target must not be the defeat of Hizbullah 
but ‘the elimination of the Lebanese military, the destruction of the national 
infrastructure and intense suffering among the population… Serious damage to 
the Republic of Lebanon, the destruction of homes and infrastructure, and the 
suffering of hundreds of thousands of people are consequences that can influence 
Hizbollah’s behavior more than anything else.’” 
 
“These thoughts, published in October 2008 were preceded by one month by the 
reflections of Col. (Ret.) Gabriel Siboni: 
 
With an outbreak of hostilities, the IDF will need to act immediately, 
decisively, and with force that is disproportionate
34 to the enemy’s actions 
and the threat it poses. Such a response aims at inflicting damage and 
meting out punishment to an extent that will demand long and expensive 
reconstruction processes. The strike must be carried out as quickly as 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/specialsession/9/docs/OpeningStatement_GazaFFM_2909
09.doc. 
34 See page 12 infra.  
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possible, and must prioritize damaging assets over seeking out each and 
every launcher. Punishment must be aimed at decision makers and the 
power elite… In Lebanon, attacks should both aim at Hizbollah’s military 
capabilities and should target economic interests and the centres of civilian 
power that support the organization. Moreover, the closer the relationship 
between Hezbollah and the Lebanese Government, the more the elements 
of the Lebanese State infrastructure should be targeted. Such a response 
will create a lasting memory among … Lebanese decision makers, thereby 
increasing Israeli deterrence and reducing the likelihood of hostilities 
against Israel for an extended period.  At the same time, it will force Syria, 
Hizbollah, and Lebanon to commit to lengthy and resource intensive 
reconstruction programmes… 
 
This approach is applicable to the Gaza Strip as well. There, the IDF will 
be required to strike hard at Hamas and to refrain from the cat and mouse 
games of searching for Qassam rocket launchers. The IDF should not be 
expected to stop the rocket and missile fire against the Israeli home front 
through attacks on the launchers themselves, but by means of imposing a 
ceasefire on the enemy.”
35 
 
These polemic snippets—calculated to deter Hezbollah and Hamas from firing rockets at 
Israeli civilians—were selected from thousands of statements made over the years by IDF 
officers.  Even so, not a single one of them—nor any statement quoted in the entire 
report—calls for the maximization of Palestinian civilian deaths, or for the specific 
targeting of Palestinian civilians.  They specifically exclude targeting civilians for death 
from the list of appropriate punitive actions, such as damage to “national infrastructure,” 
the “elimination of the Lebanese military” and generic “suffering of hundreds of 
thousands of people.”  Civilians always suffer from military actions, and even from lesser 
sanctions.  For example, on December 11, 2009, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
warned that sanctions against Iran would be intended “to persuade the Iranian 
government that they would actually be less secure with nuclear weapons” because “their 
people will suffer enormously” from sanction.
36  Surly such a statement could not be used 
to prove that the United States intends to kill Iranian civilians. 
 
The so called “Dahiya doctrine” of responding to rocket attacks with disproportionate 
force intended to destroy infrastructure says nothing about specifically targeting civilians 
for death.  To the contrary, the quoted material says that “punishment must be aimed at 
the decision makers,” referring to those who make the decision to allow the rockets to be 
fired, and to “civilian power that supports” the terrorist organization, namely Hamas.  
Ordinary people, civilians, are not mentioned.  Their exclusion is significant.  Yet the 
report misused this doctrine and these quotes to try to prove that the object of Operation 
Cast Lead was the killing of civilians.   
                                                 
35 Goldstone Report  ¶¶ 1194 1197. 
36 Glenn Kessler, Iran Probably a Target of Significant Sanctions, Gates Says, BOSTON GLOBE,  Dec. 12, 
2009, available at http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2009/12/12/ 
more_sanctions_ahead_for_iran_gates_says/.  
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The report itself admits that it does not know “whether Israeli military officials were 
directly influenced by these writings.”
37  But it reaches the conclusion that “what is 
prescribed as the best strategy appears to have been precisely what was put into 
practice.”
38  Yes!  The destruction of physical infrastructure.  Not the targeting of 
civilians.  Indeed, what was “put into practice” was a policy of warning civilians by 
phone, emails, leaflets and other means.  As we shall see, Israel went to great lengths to 
protect civilians, not to attack them.   
 
Instead of looking to the hard evidence that is completely inconsistent with any Israeli 
policy of targeting civilians and maximizing civilian deaths, the report focused on 
selective statements of Israeli leaders made before Operation Cast Lead and calculated to 
deter rocket attacks by threatening a disproportionate response.   
 
It is more than ironic that the same report refused to credit much more specific statements 
made by Hamas leaders before Operation Cast Lead.  On February 29, 2008, Fathi 
Hammad, a leading Hamas legislator, made the following statement:   
 
“For the Palestinian people, death has become an industry, at which women excel, 
and so do all the people living on this land. The elderly excel at this, and so do the 
mujahideen and the children. This is why they have formed human shields of the 
women, the children, the elderly, and the mujahideen, in order to challenge the 
Zionist bombing machine.  It is as if they were saying to the Zionist enemy: ‘We 
desire death like you desire life.’”
39 
 
The report quoted this statement and then chose to ignore it.  This is what it said:   
 
“Although the Mission finds this statement morally repugnant, it does not 
consider it to constitute evidence that Hamas forced Palestinian civilians to shield 
military objectives against attack.”
40 
 
Nor apparently did it consider it in any way relevant to whether Palestinian civilians 
willingly allowed themselves to be used as human shields—or even as to whether the IDF 
might reasonably have believed it to be relevant when they planned the operation. 
 
In contrast to this dismissive attitude toward this and other specific and bellicose 
statements
41 and threats of Hamas political leaders, the report attributed considerable 
weight to vague and general statements made by Israeli political officials during and after 
Operation Cast Lead.  It focused particularly on one statement made by Tzipi Livni who 
                                                 
37Goldstone Report  ¶ 1199. 
38 Id. ¶ 1199. 
39 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hamas Exploitation of Civilians, Jan. 13, 2009, available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism +Obstacle+to+Peace/Terror+Groups/Hamas_Exploitation_ 
Civilians_Jan_2009.htm. 
40 Goldstone Report  ¶ 478. 
41 For instance, the report notes that a Hamas fighter said he tried to fire rockets and mortars near homes “in 
the hope that nearby civilians would deter Israel from responding.” Goldstone Report  ¶ 453.  
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was then Israel’s Minister of Foreign Affairs.  On January 13, 2009, Livni said, “We have 
proven to Hamas that we have changed the equation.  Israel is not a country upon which 
you fire missiles and it does not respond.  It is a country that when you fire on its citizens 
it responds by going wild—and this is a good thing.”
42 
 
The report also quotes Eli Yishai, then Minster of Industry, Trade and Labour.  Yishai 
said on January 6, 2009, “It [should be] possible to destroy Gaza, so they will understand 
not to mess with us…it is a great opportunity to demolish thousands of houses of all the 
terrorists, so they will think twice before they launch rockets.  I hope the operation will 
come to an end with great achievements and with the complete destruction of terrorism 
and Hamas.  In my opinion, they should be razed to the ground, so thousands of houses, 
tunnels, and industries will be demolished….[T]he operation will continue until a total 
destruction of Hamas.”
43  The report quotes Yishai as saying on February 2, 2009, “Even 
if the rockets fall in an open air or to the sea, we should hit their infrastructure, and 
destroy 100 homes for every rocket fired.”
44   
 
With these quotes in hand the report concludes, “Statements by political and military 
leaders prior to and during the military operations in Gaza leave little doubt that 
disproportionate destruction and violence against civilians were part of a deliberate 
policy.”
45  There is an argument, albeit a very weak one, that these quotes suggest an 
unlawful policy of disproportionate destruction of property.  This argument is weak 
because the use of the word “disproportionate” quoted on page 9 supra does not 
constitute an admission that unlawfully disproportionate force would be employed under 
the standards of international law.  Under international law, the harm collaterally inflicted 
on civilians must not be disproportionate to the military objective.
46  But there is no 
prohibition against using overwhelming—that is disproportionate —military force against 
a legitimate military object.
47  Israel had a perfect right to kill every single Hamas fighter, 
even if that number was in the thousands, in order to stop the rockets from endangering 
millions of Israeli civilians.  The fact that 8,000 Hamas rockets succeeded in killing only 
a dozen or so Israelis, does not require Israel to limit the number of Hamas combatants 
killed.  Reading the quote on page 8 does not suggest that the speaker was urging 
disproportionate civilian casualties but rather he was urging military force greater than 
and disproportionate to the number of Israelis killed by to the rockets that were being 
fired at Israeli civilians.  This is perfectly lawful under international law.  If 
proportionality were required in relation to military targets, it would be impossible for 
                                                 
42 Goldstone Report  ¶ 1206. 
43 Id. ¶ 1204. 
44 Id.  ¶ 1205 (emphasis added). 
45 Id. ¶ 1215 (emphasis added).  
46 See generally JEAN MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUSE DOSWALD BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW VOL. I, 46 (“Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited.”). 
47 See, e.g., JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, LAW OF WAR WORKSHOP DESKBOOK 166, available at 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/low workbook.pdf (noting that the proportionality principle is 
“only applicable when an attack has the possibility of affecting civilians.  If the target is purely military 
with no known civilian personnel or property in the vicinity, no proportionality analysis need be 
conducted.”).  
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countries like the United States to employ its overwhelming military weapons—drones, 
tomahawk missiles, stealth bombers—against terrorists, who are poorly equipped but 
determined to kill.     
 
To argue, moreover, that these polemical statements directed against property and 
terrorists conclusively prove a “deliberate policy” of “violence against civilians” is 
simply absurd.  Livni suggests that Israel will “go wild” on Hamas in order to restore 
deterrence, and nowhere suggests civilians will be targeted.  Yishai says he wants to 
“destroy Gaza,” but quickly clarifies that this means “complete destruction of terrorism 
and Hamas,” a legitimate military objective.  The report concludes that Yishai’s quote 
regarding destruction of homes may suggest “reprisals against civilians … contrary to 
international humanitarian law.”
48  Unsurprisingly, the report omits that in this same 
speech Yishai clarifies that homes destroyed will be “terrorists’ homes while informing 
them in advance —so as not to hurt the family members.”
49  This deliberate omission is 
particularly disturbing, since it is directly relevant to the report’s most damning 
condemnation of Israel, and the omitted portion of the quote undercuts the report’s 
conclusion.  One can be extremely critical of some of the statements quoted in the report 
without using them as a basis for the non sequitur argument that they prove an intent to 
do what they pointedly do not advocate: namely the deliberate killing of babies, innocent 
women and other civilians.   
 
The report seems to realize its own weaknesses.  It attempts to shore up the connection 
between political statements and a “deliberate policy” of “violence against civilians” by 
suggesting Israel sees Hamas’ supporting infrastructure as “encompass[ing] effectively 
the population of Gaza.”
50  According to this argument, Israel intentionally targets 
civilians because it considers them the Hamas infrastructure.  The report’s purported 
evidence for this dubious claim is the “indiscriminate and disproportionate impact of 
[Israel’s] restrictions on the movement of goods and people [into Gaza].”
51  It simply 
does not follow, however, that Israel’s blockade means Israel considers all Gaza civilians 
to constitute Hamas supporting infrastructure, or that all Gaza civilians are appropriate 
military targets.  A blockade is a blunt instrument; by definition it is deleterious to 
civilian life (see, for instance, the statement by Robert Gates, quoted at page 9 supra).  
There is an enormous difference—a difference ignored by the report but not by Israel—
between depriving civilians of non essential commodities and targeting civilians for 
murder.  It is a classic non sequitur to argue that a boycott proves an intent to kill.   
 
The report’s second piece of evidence that Israel considers all Gazans to be Hamas 
infrastructure is that Hamas won parliamentary elections.
52  The Mission, of course, has 
no evidence that Israeli leadership considers Gazan civilians who voted for Hamas to 
constitute Hamas infrastructure.  Moreover, many civilians did not vote in the election 
                                                 
48 Goldstone Report  ¶ 1216. 
49Raanan Ben Zur, Yishai: Destroy 100 Houses for Each Rocket Fired, YNET, Feb. 2, 2009, available at 
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L 3665517,00.html. 
50 Goldstone Report  ¶1211.   
51 Id.  ¶ 1211. 
52 Id.  ¶ 1210.  
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and some who did voted against Hamas.  The report stretches for any argument, no 
matter how unrealistic, to support its conclusion that Israel had a deliberate policy of 
murdering civilians. 
 
In addition to relying on statements of military and political officials, the report also 
points to the IDF’s advanced military capabilities in concluding that Israel intentionally 
targeted civilians.  The argument is that, because the IDF uses such advanced weaponry, 
whenever civilians were killed, they must have been killed intentionally.  On multiple 
occasions, the report notes that the IDF “possesses very advanced hardware” and that 
Israel is “a market leader in the production of some of the most advanced pieces of 
military technology available.”
53  It also notes that Israel has “very significant capacity 
for precision strikes” and “extensive and intimate knowledge” of Gaza.
54  The report 
concludes that, “taking into account the ability to plan [and] the means to execute plans 
with the most developed technology available…the incident and patterns of events that 
are considered in this report have resulted from deliberate planning and policy 
decisions.”
55 
 
It should go without saying that, no matter how advanced or sophisticated weaponry may 
be, errors are made in the fog of war.  A month before Operation Cast Lead, United 
States forces in Afghanistan attacked a wedding, killing nearly forty civilians.
56  
Although everyone agrees that the United States has advanced weaponry, no reasonable 
person would argue that this is proof that America was targeting an Afghan wedding 
party.  Likewise, Israeli use of sophisticated weaponry should not serve as proof that 
Israelis intended to kill civilians during Operation Cast Lead.  After all, the IDF killed 
several of its own soldiers through “friendly fire” mistakes.
57 
 
The Goldstone Report purports to connect advanced weaponry to intentional killing by 
erasing the possibility of error.  The report paints the IDF as a military force that, unlike 
any other military force in the world, simply does not commit errors.  The report quotes 
approvingly an IDF report stating that “99 per  cent of the [air force] firing that was 
carried out hit targets accurately.”
58  There are two problems with relying on this figure to 
conclude intentionality.  First, the figure speaks only to the air force and does not include 
ground force accuracy.  The air force, with its guided weapons, more often hits intended 
targets than, for instance, a tank attempting to shell its attackers.  The overall IDF 
accuracy rate must be lower than 99%.  The second issue with concluding intentionality 
from an accuracy figure is the mistake of fact issue.  If an Israeli soldier targets a person 
he believes to be a militant and kills him, but the person killed was not a militant, the 
soldier still made ‘accurate’ use of his weapon within the meaning of the 99% figure.  
However, because the soldier made a mistake of fact, he would not possess the requisite 
purpose to be liable for intentional killing of a civilian.  This is particularly significant in 
                                                 
53 Id.  ¶ 61. 
54 Id.  ¶¶ 1185, 1180. 
55 Id.  ¶ 1190. 
56 Tom Coghlan, US Says Sorry After Wedding Party is Bombed in Ambush, THE TIMES (London), Nov. 6, 
2008. 
57 Goldstone Report  ¶ 364. 
58 Id.  ¶1188.    
  15
light of the fact that so many Hamas combatants wore civilian clothing and mingled with 
the civilian population.   
 
In one of the incidents the report investigated, the attack on the al Daia residence, Israel 
claimed a mistake of fact defense.  According to Israel, “[T]he IDF intended to strike a 
weapons’ storage facility located in a building next this [the Al Daia] residence. 
However, the IDF erroneously targeted the Al Daia residence, rather than the weapons 
storehouse.”
59   
 
The report claims that it is aware of no other Israeli admissions of error besides the Al 
Daia incident.  Therefore, the report makes the astonishing conclusion that no other errors 
occurred.  The report reads, “[S]ince it [the Al Daia incident] appears to be the only 
incident that has elicited admission of error by the Israeli authorities, the Mission takes 
the view that the Government of Israel does not consider the other strikes brought to its 
attention to be the result of similar or other errors.”
60  It is important to note the 
implication that this statement concerns all incidents, not just those incidents investigated 
in the report.  After all, the statement is made in a section discussing “the objectives and 
the strategy underlying the Israeli military operations in Gaza.”  The Mission’s claim, 
however, that “it has found only one example [Al Daia] where the Israeli authorities have 
acknowledged that an error had occurred,”
61 is not made in good faith.  Justice Goldstone 
and the Mission need only look at the Israeli government report entitled “The Operation 
in Gaza” (cited over 50 times in the Goldstone Report) to find other Israeli admissions of 
error.  In “The Operation in Gaza,” the Israeli government claims that an attack on an 
oxygen truck that killed four civilians and four Hamas militants was a mistake of fact 
error.  The IDF erroneously believed the oxygen canisters to be rockets and targeted the 
truck for destruction.
62  Four out of the nine IDF deaths were caused by friendly fire.
63  
Of course these deaths were errors.  Surely there were many more errors, as there always 
are in war.
64  To assume that all of the deaths caused by errors were, in fact, deliberate, 
begs the critical question and reflects the bias of the report.    
 
The fourth category of evidence the Goldstone Report relies upon in concluding Israel 
had a policy of murdering civilians is simply the number of civilian casualties.  At the 
outset it must be noted that the death of civilians does not automatically prove 
commission of war crimes.  According to Louis Moreno Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of 
the International Criminal Court, “Under international humanitarian law and the Rome 
Statute, the death of civilians during an armed conflict, no matter how grave and 
regrettable, does not in itself constitute a war crime.  International humanitarian law and 
the Rome Statute permit belligerents to carry out proportionate attacks against military 
                                                 
59 Id.  ¶ 854.  The report is skeptical of this defense, and claims the Israeli explanation “appears to lack 
coherence and raises more questions than it answers.”  Id. ¶ 860. 
60 Id.  ¶ 1187. 
61 Id.  ¶ 1187. 
62 STATE OF ISRAEL, THE OPERATION IN GAZA: FACTUAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS ¶¶ 398 400 (July 2009), 
available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/E89E699D A435 491B B2D0017675DAFEF7/0/ 
GazaOperationwLinks.pdf [hereinafter THE OPERATION IN GAZA: FACTUAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS]. 
63 Goldstone Report  ¶ 364. 
64 See, e.g., THE OPERATION IN GAZA: FACTUAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS ¶¶ 377, 394 295.  
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objectives, even when it is known that some civilian deaths or injuries will occur.”
65   The 
report strongly implies that the number of civilians killed in Operation Cast Lead is 
evidence of Israel’s intent to kill civilians.  Results prove intent, at least when it comes to 
Israel.
66  For instance, the report notes that “some of those killed were combatants 
directly engaged in hostilities against Israel, but many were not. The outcome and the 
modalities of the operations indicate, in the Mission’s view, that they were only partially 
aimed at killing leaders and members of Hamas, al Qassam Brigades and other armed 
groups.”
67  But a careful analysis of the results, in fact, proves the exact opposite. 
 
The chart below illustrates a breakdown of Palestinian casualties during the Gaza 
operation as reported by the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, B’Tselem, and the 
Israeli Defense Forces.  The PCHR maintains that 1,417 people were killed by Israeli 
forces, including 926 civilians, 255 policemen, and 236 combatants.  B’Tselem counts 
1,387 Palestinian deaths, including 773 civilians, 248 policemen, 330 combatants, and 26 
unknown.
68  The IDF claim the total number of casualties was 1,166, including 295 
civilians, 709 combatants (the IDF includes policemen in the combatant category) and 
162 unknown.  
 
 
                                                 
65 Letter from Louis Moreno Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (Feb. 9, 2006), 
available at http://www2.icc cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/F596D08D D810 43A2 99BB 
B899B9C5BCD2/277422/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February_2006.pdf. 
66 Contrast this approach with that taken with regard to “results” attributable to Hamas, such as the wearing 
of civilian clothing, which the report deems to be without significance to the intentions of Hamas.   
67 Goldstone Report  ¶1890. 
68 B’Tselem has revised its casualty count slightly and now counts 762 civilian deaths.  The new figures do 
break down the casualties into categories of unknown/ civilians/ police/ combatants, so the older figures are 
used here.  See B’Tselem,  One Year Since Operation Cast Lead, Still  o Accountability, Dec. 27, 2009, 
available at http://www.btselem.org/English/Gaza_Strip/20091227_A_year_to_Castlead_Operation.asp.  
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To deconstruct these figures properly, the status of the Gaza police must first be 
considered, since approximately 250 of them were among those listed as “civilians” who 
were killed.  Although the Goldstone Report concludes that the Gaza police force was a 
“civilian law enforcement agency,”
69 there is overwhelming evidence to suggest 
otherwise.  The Gaza police has its origins in the Hamas Executive Force.  When the 
Executive Force was formed in 2006, its commander announced that the force was “the 
nucleus of the future Palestinian army.  The resistance must continue.  We have only one 
enemy.  They are Jews.  We have no other enemy.  I will continue to carry the rifle and 
pull the trigger whenever required to defend my people.” 
70  According to the report, the 
Executive Force merged with a reorganized PA police in October 2007.
71  Despite the 
fact that the Executive Force no longer technically exists, during Operation Cast Lead a 
police spokesman said, “Police officers received clear orders from the leadership to face 
the enemy, if the Gaza Strip were to be invaded.”
72  This is conclusive evidence that the 
Gaza police were not entitled to the protections accorded to civilians in war.  In addition, 
evidence suggests many policemen were combatant individuals regardless of their 
connection with the police.
73  According to one count, 91% of the policemen killed were 
either members of a terrorist organization or in infantry training, with a “decisive 
majority” of casualties belonging to military wings.
74  In any event, reasonable people 
can and do disagree as to the status of the Gaza policemen killed by Israel.  They cannot 
simply be lumped together with infants and other obvious non combatants for purposes 
of listing the number of dead civilians.
75 
 
There is clearly a large divergence between the IDF numbers and the PCHR and 
B’Tselem numbers.  Although the Goldstone report claims that Israel’s numbers “fall far 
short of international law standards,”
76 the PCHR numbers that the report cites are 
                                                 
69 Goldstone Report.  ¶ 436. 
70 Id.  ¶ 412;  ew PA Police Chief Marks Jews as “Only Enemy” of Palestinians, HAARETZ, Apr. 23, 2006, 
available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=708275& contrassID=1& 
subContrassID=0&sbSubContrassID=0.  The Goldstone Report omitted “They are Jews. We have no other 
enemy,” which is present in the original quote. 
71 Goldstone Report  ¶ 414. 
72 Id.  ¶ 416. 
73 See INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR COUNTER TERRORISM, INTERDISCIPLINARY CENTER HERZLIYA, 
CASUALTIES IN OPERATION CAST LEAD: A CLOSER LOOK 9 (2009), available at 
http://www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Articles/ICT_Cast_Lead_Casualties A_Closer_Look.pdf [hereinafter 
CASUALTIES IN OPERATION CAST LEAD: A CLOSER LOOK].   
74 Jonathan D. Halevi, Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs, Palestinian Policemen Killed in Gaza 
Operation Were Trained Terrorists, Sept. 13, 2009, available at 
http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=1&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=4
42&PID=0&IID=3081&TTL=Palestinian_%E2%80%9CPolicemen%E2%80%9D_Killed_in_Gaza_Operat
ion_Were_Trained_Terrorists.  The Mission dismisses this evidence as unreliable on the basis that some 
policemen were characterized as members of the al Qassam Brigades simply because they were Hamas 
members and because terrorist groups are known to ‘adopt’ civilians as martyrs on their websites.  See 
Goldstone Report  ¶¶ 422  423.  While the sources cited here do rely to a degree on terrorist websites, and it 
is possible that some civilians were ‘adopted’ as martyrs, Israel is entitled to take the statements of Hamas 
at face value.  Hamas simply cannot have it both ways, claiming that someone is a civilian at one point, and 
then claiming that he is a combatant after he dies.  Not only is this hypocritical, but it shows great 
disrespect for the internationally recognized principal of distinction. 
75 See discussion of continuum of civilianality at page 27 infra. 
76 Goldstone Report  ¶ 361.  
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considerably more troubling.  For instance, some Palestinian casualties that were counted 
by PCHR as civilians were undoubtedly combatants.  PCHR classified Abdullah Abdul 
Hamid Hussam Abu Mu’ammar , Mohammed Akram Mohammed Abu Harbid, and Belal 
Hamza Ali ‘Ubeid (under 18) as civilians and identified all three as students.
77  Here are 
pictures of these three “civilians” from a militant website.
78 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
77 PALESTINIAN CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE DEAD IN THE COURSE OF THE ISRAELI RECENT MILITARY 
OFFENSIVE ON THE GAZA STRIP, available at http://www.pchrgaza.org/files/PressR/English/2008/list.pdf. 
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The second problem with the PCHR numbers is a statistical discrepancy that cannot be 
squared with the Goldstone Report’s conclusion that Israel intentionally and 
indiscriminately targeted civilians.  The International Institute for Counter Terrorism 
(ICT) at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzilya independently determined from PCHR’s 
casualty list 314 combatants, 239 policemen, and 363 civilians. This left 518 people with 
an unknown status.  If Israel killed civilians intentionally and indiscriminately, we should 
expect the distribution within the civilian/unknown category to be proportionate to the 
Gaza population, roughly 25% men, 25% boys, 25% girls, 25% women.
79  Instead, ICT 
found the civilian/unknown category was composed of 56% men, 22% boys, and 22% 
girls and women combined.  (“Boys” and “girls” are defined as under 18,
 80 and many 
boys and girls in Gaza are combatants by any definition of that term.  Indeed 16 and 17 
year olds are often used in martyr operations, precisely because of their youthful 
appearance.)  These statistics are relevant for two reasons.  First, the demographic (men) 
that is more likely to actually be terrorists, is vastly over represented in the 
unknown/civilian category.  Second, the demographic (men) that Israel is more likely to 
mistake as terrorists is vastly over represented in the unknown/civilian category.  In any 
case, these statistics are completely inconsistent with claims of intentional, indiscriminate 
killing of civilians.
82 
 
Despite the problematic nature of the highly biased PCHR count, even the story the raw 
PCHR numbers tell are not evidence of intent to kill civilians.  If we count policemen as 
combatants, there were according to PCHR 491 combatant deaths and 926 civilian 
deaths.  Thus, even according to one of the most biased and skewed sources available, 
there was a combatant casualty to civilian casualty ratio of 1 to 1.885.  That is, for every 
                                                 
79 Gaza has a young median age.  See CASUALTIES IN OPERATION CAST LEAD: A CLOSER LOOK 11.  
80 Id. 10.  It is true that males, whether terrorists or not, are more likely to be out and about, and thus in 
harm’s way, than females, especially in a traditional society, but if Israel had a policy of indiscriminately 
targeting civilians, including in their homes—as the report suggests—this factor would be negligible.   
82 See Id. 12.  
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Palestinian combatant killed, less than two civilians were killed.  It is sad that so many 
innocents died during the Gaza war, but numbers alone do not prove that Israel intended 
to kill civilians, especially in light of how Hamas used civilians as shields (see section III 
infra).  A United Nations report estimates that worldwide 75% of war casualties are 
civilians.
83  Some have suggested that the combatant civilian casualty ratio for America’s 
recent drone attacks in Pakistan is as high as 1 to 10.
84  Others have suggested that during 
NATO’s 1999 Kosovo operation, there were four civilian casualties for every combatant 
casualty.
85  In late December of 2009, an American air strike killed ten civilians in 
Afghanistan.
86  Although there are valid arguments about the prudence of these 
operations, no reasonable person argues that these numbers prove an intention to kill 
Pakistani, Yugoslav, or Afghani civilians. 
 
If the ratio alone proves anything it is that there was a policy of reducing civilian deaths, 
not targeting civilians.  If Israel’s intention was truly to kill civilians, why was the 
combatant to civilian casualty ratio only one to less than two?  Certainly if one of the 
world’s most advanced military forces intended to kill civilians it could have made that 
ratio one to five or even one to ten.  As Professor Halbertal writes, “There are 1.5 million 
people in Gaza and around 10,000 Hamas militants, so the ratio of militants to civilians is 
1:150.  If Israel targeted civilians intentionally, how on earth did it reduce such a ratio to 
1:3 or 2:3?”
87   
 
The report’s final argument, made implicitly at various points in the document, goes 
something like this:  Israel deliberately targeted non human civilian targets, such as a 
flour mill and a wastewater plant; this proves that the IDF wanted to punish civilians who 
relied on these facilities; it follows therefore that the IDF deliberately intended to hit 
human civilian targets and kill as many civilians as possible.  There are two responses to 
this argument, the first factual, the second logical. 
 
As to the facts, the New York Times has reported that the IDF study, soon to be released, 
will dispute the claim that Israel willfully targeted the food and wastewater plant:  
 
“The Goldstone report asserts that the Bader flour mill ‘was hit by an airstrike, 
possibly by an F 16.’  The Israeli investigators say they have photographic proof 
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that this is false, that the mill was accidentally hit by artillery in the course of a 
firefight with Hamas militiamen.  The dispute is significant since the United 
Nations report asserts that ‘the destruction of the mill was carried out for the 
purpose of denying sustenance to the civilian population,’ an explicit war crime. 
A second finding concerned the destruction of a wastewater plant, leading to an 
enormous outflow of raw sewage.  The Goldstone report contended that it was hit 
by a powerful Israeli missile in a strike that was ‘deliberate and premeditated.’ 
The Israelis say they had nothing to do with that plant’s collapse and suggest that 
it may have been the result of Hamas explosives.”
88 
 
I will have more to say about these incidents following the release of the Israeli rebuttal.  
But even if it were true that Israel sought to punish the civilian population of Gaza by 
attacking food and sewage facilities, it would not follow that Israel intended to kill 
civilians.  Israel acknowledged that it deliberately limits the flow of consumer goods into 
Gaza as part of an effort to impose sanctions on the Hamas government for its policy of 
targeting Israeli civilians with anti personnel weapons.  Just as American sanctions 
against Iran would cause the Iranian “people [to] suffer,”
89 so too to do Israeli sanctions.  
But it is a far cry from sanctions to murder, and it is a non sequitur to argue that the 
destructions of non human civilian targets proves an intention to target human beings for 
death.   
 
Nowhere does the report detail how difficult it is, in the fog of war, to target combatants 
while avoiding civilian casualties.  Nowhere does the report detail the great lengths Israel 
goes to in order to spare civilian lives.  It does not give any historical context.  It does not 
mention how, under the leadership of air force chief Eliezer Shkedi, the IDF worked 
diligently to decrease the combatant civilian air attack casualty ratio from 1 to 1 during 
the second intifada in 2003 to an astounding one civilian for every thirty combatants in 
2007.
90  This is the best ratio ever achieved by an armed force, and it required enormous 
dedication of resources and commitment to reduce civilian casualties, even those closely 
related to terrorist leaders.  Nor does Goldstone mention that routine Israeli policy 
sacrifices valuable military opportunities in order to protect innocent civilians.  The 
report does not tell the reader that, when Israel targeted a high level Hamas meeting in 
2003, it used a relatively light bomb in order to avoid civilian casualties.  Since it did not 
attack its targets with full capacity, all of the militants (including the Hamas leader) 
escaped.
91   
 
The report does not even discuss Israel’s professed operating procedures during 
Operation Cast Lead.  It does not discuss how the humanitarian impact on a target was 
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considered both at the planning stage and immediately prior to attack.
92  It does not 
inform the reader that where an air force pilot saw civilians straying into the path of an 
already launched missile, where possible, he diverted the missile to avoid excess civilian 
casualties.
93  The Goldstone Report does not mention that under IDF operating procedure, 
moving targets are to be struck when they are as far away from civilians as possible.
94  
During the latter part of Operation Cast Lead the IDF, to its great detriment, “unilaterally 
suspended military operations for at least three hours each day, to enable re supply of the 
population and other humanitarian relief activities.”
95  The IDF deployed 120 
humanitarian support officers during the operation.
96  How is any of this consistent with a 
general policy of targeting civilians? 
 
Israel’s efforts to protect civilians who were placed in harm’s way by Hamas’ decision to 
fire rockets from densely populated urban areas was unprecedented in military history.  
The Goldstone Mission deliberately chose to ignore the best expert testimony on 
precisely this issue.  Here is what the former commander of British forces in Afghanistan, 
Colonel Richard Kemp, told the United Nations Human Rights Council on October 16, 
2009: 
“I am the former commander of the British forces in Afghanistan. I served with 
NATO and the United Nations; commanded troops in Northern Ireland, Bosnia 
and Macedonia; and participated in the Gulf War. I spent considerable time in 
Iraq since the 2003 invasion, and worked on international terrorism for the UK 
Government’s Joint Intelligence Committee. 
 
Mr. President, based on my knowledge and experience, I can say this: During 
Operation Cast Lead, the Israeli Defence Forces did more to safeguard the rights 
of civilians in a combat zone than any other army in the history of warfare. 
 
Israel did so while facing an enemy that deliberately positioned its military 
capability behind the human shield of the civilian population.  
Hamas, like Hizballah, are expert at driving the media agenda. Both will always 
have people ready to give interviews condemning Israeli forces for war crimes. 
They are adept at staging and distorting incidents. 
 
The IDF faces a challenge that we British do not have to face to the same extent. 
It is the automatic, Pavlovian presumption by many in the international media, 
and international human rights groups, that the IDF are in the wrong, that they are 
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abusing human rights. 
 
The truth is that the IDF took extraordinary measures to give Gaza civilians notice 
of targeted areas, dropping over 2 million leaflets, and making over 100,000 
phone calls. Many missions that could have taken out Hamas military capability 
were aborted to prevent civilian casualties. During the conflict, the IDF allowed 
huge amounts of humanitarian aid into Gaza. To deliver aid virtually into your 
enemy’s hands is, to the military tactician, normally quite unthinkable.  But the 
IDF took on those risks. 
 
Despite all of this, of course innocent civilians were killed. War is chaos and full 
of mistakes. There have been mistakes by the British, American and other forces 
in Afghanistan and in Iraq, many of which can be put down to human error. But 
mistakes are not war crimes.  
 
More than anything, the civilian casualties were a consequence of Hamas’ way of 
fighting.  Hamas deliberately tried to sacrifice their own civilians. 
 
Mr. President, Israel had no choice apart from defending its people, to stop Hamas 
from attacking them with rockets. 
 
And I say this again: the IDF did more to safeguard the rights of civilians in a 
combat zone than any other army in the history of warfare.”
97 
 
Colonel Kemp had made the same points during Operation Cast Lead and they were well 
known to the writers of the Goldstone Report, who deliberately chose to ignore this 
expert testimony.  Goldstone acknowledged that the omission was deliberate and tried to 
explain it away: 
 
“[T]was no reliance on Col. Kemp mainly because in our Report we did not deal 
with the issues he raised regarding the problems of conducting military operations 
in civilian areas and second guessing decisions made by soldiers and their 
commanding officers ‘in the fog of war.’”
98 
. 
That is a willful lie.  The report dealt specifically with precisely that issue.  Everything 
the Israeli Army did was done in the course of a difficult military operation designed to 
stop rockets fired from civilian areas from targeting a million Israeli children, women and 
other civilians.  The basic flaw of the Goldstone Report is that, without a scintilla of 
evidence, the biased commissioners concluded that the Israeli military action in Gaza was 
motivated not by the defense of its citizens but rather by desire to murder Palestinian 
civilians.  Based on that unproven, untrue and biased conclusion, the commission was 
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then able to ignore massive evidence, much of it self proving and easily available on the 
internet, that the Israeli Army took considerable steps to reduce civilian casualties, while 
engaged in military action designed to prevent the murder of its own civilians.  Had it 
considered and credited Colonel Kemp’s conclusion that “the IDF did more to safeguard 
the rights of civilians in a combat zone than any other army in the history of warfare,” it 
could not come to the mendacious conclusion it reached, namely that it was the explicit 
policy of the IDF to target Palestinian civilians and to maximize civilian deaths.  A 
nation’s armed forces cannot at the same time do more to safeguard civilians than any 
army in history, while it is targeting them for death.  There is a simpler and more sinister 
reason why the report chose to ignore the expert testimony of Colonel Kemp: it totally 
undercut the central conclusion of the report regarding Israel’s policy, intentions and 
actions.  The very idea that the report “did not deal with the issues” raised so powerfully 
by Colonel Kemp, as Goldstone has claimed, speaks volumes about the bias of its 
authors. 
 
For the most part, the report dismisses Israeli attempts to aid civilians.  As Professor 
Moshe Halbertal wrote:   
 
“In line with [the] principles [developed for the IDF by Professor Halbertal and 
others], the Israeli Air Force developed the following tactic.  Since Hamas hides 
its headquarters and ammunition storage facilities inside civilian residential areas, 
the Israeli army calls the residents’ telephones or cell phones, asking them to 
move immediately out of the house because an attack is imminent.  But Hamas, in 
reaction to such calls, brings the innocent residents up to the roof, so as to protect 
the target from an attack, knowing that, as a rule, the Israeli army films the target 
with an unmanned drone and will avoid attacking the civilians on the roof.  In 
response to this tactic, Israel developed a missile that hits the roof without causing 
any actual harm in order to show the seriousness of its intention.  The procedure, 
called ‘roof knocking,’ causes the civilians to move away before the deadly 
attack.” 
 
“It is rather a strange point in the Goldstone Report that this practice, which goes 
a long way to protect civilians, is actually criticized.  Concerning such a practice, 
the report states that, “if this was meant as a warning shot, it has to be deemed 
reckless in the extreme.”  The truth is that this is an admirable and costly effort to 
avoid civilian collateral harm.  As is true with many of its criticisms, the report 
does not state what the alternative should be.  What should Israel do in such a 
case?  Attack the house without calling on its residents to move, or attack it while 
they are gathered on the roof?  Or maybe avoid attacks altogether, allowing the 
enemy to take effective shelter among civilians?”
99 
 
Neither the report nor its author addressed Professor Halbertal’s questions. 
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It also ignored the vast evidence of Israeli actions on the ground that were utterly 
inconsistent with any purported policy of targeting civilians or maximizing civilian 
deaths.  These actions included the evacuation to Israeli hospitals of wounded civilians,
100 
the foregoing of appropriate military targets because the risk to civilians was too great,
101 
and—as Colonel Kemp explained—the massive repeated and expensive warnings the 
IDF provided to civilians.  Finally, the report virtually ignores the fact that Israel choose 
not to invade Gaza City.  Only this phase would have assured military victory by 
capturing or killing the Hamas fighters responsible for the planning and firing of 
rockets.
102  At least part of the reason for not invading Gaza City was the realization that 
many Palestinian civilians would inevitably be killed or injured.  Here is a picture of 
Israel admitting a Gazan child for treatment through the Erez Crossing on Dec. 31, 
2008.
103 
 
 
 
As the New York Times recently reported: 
 
“General Halamish said in an interview that the army chose not to attack many 
leaders of Hamas because they lived among children and the elderly.  He added 
that during the operation, Israel withheld fire for three hours a day so food and 
other aid supplies could be brought into Gaza.  During these hours he said, a 
quarter of the shooting from Hamas took place.  Hamas also ambushed the 
civilian supply trucks.” 
… 
 
“Another senior military official who spoke on the condition of anonymity 
following regular military practice, said that neither the military command 
structure nor the government wanted to invade Gaza in December 2008, but felt 
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that the continental rocket attacks by Hamas on Israeli civilians forced their hand.  
The war, he said, followed the least aggressive of three contemplated routes — 
conquer Gaza and occupy it again as was done in the West Bank in 2002, retake 
Hamas’s weapons supply routes and hold them to dry out the organization’s 
arsenal, or attack the Hamas military and state infrastructure and leave.  It was the 
third that occurred.”
104 
 
The report does not address these facts on the ground.  Nor does it consider the most 
basic question of all: What would Israel gain by targeting civilians for death?  It simply is 
not rational for Israel to target civilians.  The Goldstone Report has brought worldwide 
condemnation upon Israel.  Surely Israel would not want to bring such condemnation 
upon herself.     
 
Every Israeli official understands that every time a Palestinian civilian—especially a 
child or woman—is killed, Israel loses.  As a western diplomat put it several years ago:  
Palestinian terrorists have “mastered” the “harsh arithmetic of pain.”  “Palestinian 
[civilian] casualties play in their favor, and Israeli [civilian] casualties play in their 
favor.”
105  Every time a Palestinian terrorist kills an Israeli civilian, Hamas wins.  And 
every time an Israeli soldier kills a Palestinian civilian, Hamas wins.  That is their 
strategy, and it is a win win for terrorism and a lose lose for democracy.
106  Civilian 
deaths are inevitable in a conflict of this kind, but the accusation that they are part of a 
deliberate Israeli plan or policy defies reality and is wrong as a matter of fact.  
Reasonable people may disagree as to whether the deaths that resulted from Israel’s 
military objects were proportional or disproportional to risks its civilians feared from 
Hamas rockets.  Reasonable people could also disagree about whether Israel’s policy of 
destroying Hamas buildings, tunnels and industry should be permissible under 
international law.  But that is not the essence of what the report accuses Israel of 
deliberately planning—namely the deliberate targeting and killing of hundreds of 
innocent Palestinian women and children.  On this most serious of charges, not only is 
there absolutely no evidence that points to this conclusion, what evidence there is points 
exactly the other way.  Yet the report distorts the evidence, misquotes its sources, and 
turns the truth on its head, in order to arrive at a conclusion that at least some of its 
members had reached before even beginning to gather evidence for the report.   
 
It is important to note that the report contains disturbing narratives accusing IDF soldiers 
of murdering Palestinian civilians.  The Goldstone Report does not contain enough 
evidence to prove war crimes were committed, but parts of it do suggest investigations 
should be opened into the conduct of certain soldiers.  Israel fully accepts the obligation 
to investigate and has carried out investigations of 140 incidents.
107  If any soldiers 
committed war crimes, they should be prosecuted and punished in accordance with Israeli 
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law.  It bears no repeating that the commission of war crimes must be subjected to the 
strongest possible condemnation.  If any soldier intentionally targeted Palestinian 
civilians, we must condemn him in the same manner that Hamas is condemned for 
targeting Israeli civilians.  
 
Rogue soldiers are a fact of war.  No matter how exacting military discipline, there will 
always be a soldier who sees war as an opportunity to release his own brutality.  
Recently, an American Private was convicted of murdering four innocent civilians while 
on duty in Iraq.
108  This does not mean, however, that it is the policy of the American 
forces to murder civilians.  Yet the Goldstone Report takes the alleged instances of Israeli 
soldiers intentionally targeting civilians and claims it was the policy of Israel to 
intentionally target civilians.  There is simply no evidence to support this illogical 
conclusion. 
 
To its discredit, the Goldstone Report treats many complex and nuanced military, moral, 
and legal issues in an overly simplistic manner.  The question of who is a civilian, for 
instance, is generally relegated to a footnote.
109  This is, of course, a highly complex 
issue, especially in the context of fighting a terrorist enemy embodied in a quasi 
government.  It is intellectually dishonest to say that the question of who is a civilian is a 
black and white matter.  There is no moral equivalence between bombing a home 
containing a harmless Palestinian baby and bombing a home in which the IDF knows a 
Palestinian ‘civilian’ has willingly stored Hamas rockets.  Reasonable people must 
recognize that there is a “continuum of civilianality.”
110   On one end of this continuum 
are those who send rockets into Israel.  On the other end are those innocents who do not 
contribute in any way to the Hamas terrorist enterprise.  At various points along the 
continuum are those who willingly store rockets for Hamas, who willingly provide 
Hamas with expertise in making rockets, and who willingly allow themselves to be used 
as human shields.  Simply listing the numbers of civilians killed during the operation 
does not recognize that the casualties are distributed across this continuum.   
 
The Supreme Court of Israel has grappled with these questions at length.  Contrary to the 
Goldstone Report’s claim,
111 Israel recognizes article 51(3) of the Geneva Convention’s 
First Protocol (“Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this section, unless and 
for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”) as binding customary international 
law in its entirety.
112  This internationally recognized articulation of civilian status, 
however, is not self defining.  As Justice Aharon Barak wrote, “[W]ithout a 
comprehensive and agreed upon customary standard, there is no escaping going case by 
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case….”
113  The Court, for instance, has determined that one who contributes money to a 
terrorist organization maintains the protection of civilian status, but that one who 
willingly acts as a human shield forfeits his civilian status.
114  These are profound moral 
and legal questions.  Reasonable people can disagree.  Rather than explore these issues, 
however, the Goldstone Report ignores the complexity.  It does not mention the 
possibility of differences along the “continuum of civilianality.”  It does not even ask 
how ‘civilian’ is defined in its oft quoted casualty figures.  As with the question of who is 
a civilian, the report reduces the nuances entailed in the proportionality question to 
simplicity.  Although the report quotes a statement inquiring “to what extent is a military 
commander obliged to expose his own forces to danger in order to limit civilian 
casualties,”
115 it simply quotes that the answer is very difficult to determine.
116  Difficult 
indeed!  It is a small wonder, then, that in almost every instance the report condemns 
Israel for making the incorrect judgment.
117  The report completely ignores the tortured 
Israeli debate over whether and to what extent a democracy can value the lives of its 
soldiers over the lives of enemy civilians.  Prof. Asa Kasher of Tel Aviv University 
claims that “There is no army in the world that will endanger its soldiers in order to avoid 
hitting the neighbors of an enemy or terrorist.”
118  As such, he believes Israel should 
privilege the live of her soldiers over the lives of civilians.  Prof. Halbertal disagrees.  He 
writes, “It is wrong to give the commanding officer a blank check to shoot anytime his 
soldiers are at probable risk—but he must be given the means of protecting them as 
well.”
119  Reasonable people can disagree on these questions, but the Goldstone Report 
leaves no room for nuance.  It condemns Israel at every turn.  As Prof. Halbertal writes, 
“These are not simple issues….They are the occasions of deep moral struggle, because 
they are matters of life and death.  If you are looking for an understanding of these issues, 
or for guidance about them, in the Goldstone Report, you will not find it.”
120 
 
Goldstone and his colleagues were criticized for their black and white views on these 
matters at an expert discussion sponsored by the respected think tank Chatam House.  
The meeting concluded, “There is a…difficulty with international humanitarian law; the 
rules can be subject to different interpretations.  A commission should tease out these 
legal issues and should make its view clear on the interpretation it favours.  The 
Goldstone Report does not set out in detail its interpretation of the law in order to 
determine which facts are relevant to determine whether a target was legitimate or not.  It 
did not need to express a definite view in the way that a court should, but merely needed 
to record that different interpretations exist on a given point, and indicate the facts which 
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would be relevant to a tribunal.”
121  That, of course, is precisely what the report failed to 
do.  In its rush to condemn Israel, it failed to address the difficult questions faced by 
democracies fighting against terrorists who fire rockets from highly populated areas.  
Because the conclusion of the report was predetermined, there was no need for nuance. 
 
Even before the report was issued, I urged the mission to consider the following 
questions and respond to them in its report: 
 
1.  What should a democracy do when terrorist groups, with widespread 
support from the local populations, commit the war crime of firing 
thousands of deadly, anti personnel rockets at its school children, women 
and other civilians?  What military options are available under 
international law to stop these crimes?  Must they simply accept the 
rockets without responding?  Or wait until one hits a school filled with 
children and kills hundreds? 
 
2.  Did Barak Obama incite war crimes or grave violations of human rights 
when he said the following in Sderot during a visit in 2008: 
 
“I don’t think any country would find it acceptable to have missiles 
raining down on the heads of their citizens.   
 
The first job of any nation state is to protect its citizens.  And so I 
can assure you that if—I don’t even care if I was a politician.  If 
somebody was sending rockets into my house where my two 
daughters sleep at night, I’m going to do everything in my power 
to stop that.  And I would expect Israelis to do the same thing.”   
 
3.  What have other nations, such as the United States, Great Britain and 
Russia done when faced with far less grave threats to its civilians in 
Afghanistan, Chechnya and other places? 
 
4.  What would your own nations do if any enemy whose charter calls for its 
destruction was firing rockets at its civilians? 
 
5.  Was British Colonel Richard Kemp, a military expert, lying when he said 
the following during the Gaza conflict:   
 
“[F]rom my knowledge of the IDF and from the extent to which I 
have been following the current operation, I don’t think there has 
ever been a time in the history of warfare when any army has made 
more efforts to reduce civilian casualties and deaths of innocent 
people than the IDF is doing today in Gaza.” 
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If you disagree with Colonel Kemp, list the countries that have done more 
to protect civilians and indicate what more Israel could have done in the 
face of rockets being fired from behind human shields. 
 
6.  Do you dispute the fact that Hamas deliberately fired its rockets from 
behind human shield in an effort to provoke the Israeli military into killing 
Palestinian “shields?” Do you disagree with the following statement made 
by Fathi Hammad, a Hamas legislator: 
 
“For the Palestinian people, death has become an industry, at 
which women excel, and so do all the people living on this land.  
The elderly excel at this, and so do the mujahideen and the 
children.  This is why they have formed human shields of the 
women, the children, the elderly, and the mujahideen, in order to 
challenge the Zionist bombing machine.  It is as if they were 
saying to the Zionist enemy:  ‘We desire death like your desire 
life.’” 
 
7.  Is it a violation of human rights to try to stop rockets that are being fired at 
civilians from behind human shields?  If so, what should a democracy do 
when faced with such a situation? 
 
8.  In the civilian context, when a criminal fires from behind a hostage, and 
the police, in an effort to stop the shooter, inadvertently kill the hostage, it 
is the hostage taker and not the policeman who is guilty of murder.  Does 
the same rule apply when under international law?  If not, why not?   
 
I argued that no commission could credibly investigate what Israel did, unless it first set 
out with clarity what it believed Israel should have done and could have done under 
international law to prevent Hamas rockets from continuing to target a million Israeli 
civilians.  I said that a United Nations Investigation of Israel—in the face of that body’s 
absolute refusal to investigate Russia, China, Zimbabwe, Iran and so many other 
countries that routinely violate human rights in an egregious manner—would constitute a 
major victory for the Hamas double war crime strategy of targeting Israeli civilians from 
behind Palestinian human shields.  It would send a powerful message to all terrorist 
groups that provoking democracies into responding to attacks on its civilians will result 
in United Nations condemnation.
122 
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I called for the international community, led by the experts who were appointed to 
investigate Israel, first to decide what the appropriate response is for democracies faced 
with attacks on its civilians by terrorists who hide behind their own civilians.  Only after 
it is first decided, in a neutral manner, what rules of self defense should apply to all 
democracies faced with terrorism by those who hide behind civilians, could an 
independent body then credibly apply these standards to the actions of a particular 
country. 
 
The Goldstone Report did not address any of these issues.  Instead, it simply condemned 
Israel without suggesting what lawful steps Israel could have taken to protect its civilians 
from Hamas rockets.  In his public appearances defending the report, Goldstone has 
suggested that Israel could have sought protection from the United Nations, as if Israel 
had not repeatedly been rebuffed by that body.  When asked what Israel should have done 
to prevent rocket attacks, Goldstone said, “Well, it could have used greater pressure by 
diplomatic means.  They could have used the security council for that purpose.”
123  Israel 
did go to the United Nations for help and sent tens of letters informing the security 
council of the continued attacks on its territory.
124  If going to the United Nations failed 
(which, of course, it did) he said that Israel could have used commando operations or 
targeted killings of terrorists—actions for which Israel has been repeatedly condemned 
by United Nations organs.  The question remains unanswered, what could Israel have 
done to protect its civilians without running afoul of the Goldstone Report’s conception 
of international law?  (The realistic answer is “nothing.”) 
 
III. GOLDSTONE: HAMAS DOES NOT USE HUMAN SHIELDS  
The reports “findings” that Hamas fighters do not wear civilian clothes in order to hide 
among the civilians and that they do not store weapons in mosques or use human shields, 
tells us more about the composition and bias of those who wrote the report than it does 
about the truth of these conclusions.
125  The evidence is overwhelming, indisputable, and 
widely accepted by all people of good will that Hamas does: 1. Deliberately have its 
fighters wear civilian clothes so as to make them indistinguishable from the regular 
population; 2. That it does demand that women and children serve as human shields and 
assemble at houses that are appropriate military targets; 3. That Hamas fighters 
deliberately fire rockets from near schools, mosques, and other civilian buildings; 4. That 
Hamas uses mosques and other civilian buildings and homes to store weapons; and 5. 
That Hamas deliberately does all these for the very purpose of provoking Israel into 
taking military actions that will result in the deaths of Palestinian civilians so that Hamas 
can then complain to the media and to human rights and governmental organizations.  No 
reasonable person could dispute this reality.  Yet the report found “no evidence” that any 
of these well known facts were true.  This tells us a great deal about the methodology 
used to gather evidence.  If in fact, they found no evidence of such actions, it is for 
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several reasons: 1. Hamas controlled their access to facts by selecting the areas they 
could investigate; 2. Hamas controlled the testimony that they received from Palestinians 
on the ground; 3. Hamas concealed and or destroying incriminating evidence; and 4. the 
members of the Mission closed their eyes to such evidence or refused to look for it in 
readily available public sources.  
 
It is important to convey the exact nature of the report’s findings on Hamas.  In the 
following sections I will show that in each and every instance the Mission’s findings 
either understate the nature of Hamas actions or, more often than not, come to 
conclusions that are completely at odds with hard evidence easily available in the public 
domain.
126  In the final section I will demonstrate the report’s deep evidentiary bias in 
inferring criminal intent against Israel but not Hamas. 
 
  A.  Militant Activity in Residential Areas 
 
The report concluded, in overtly tepid terms, that militants fired rockets from urban and 
residential areas.  Here are the report’s half hearted findings: 
 
“In view of the information communicated to it and the material it was able to 
review, the Mission believes that there are indications that Palestinian armed 
groups launched rockets from urban areas.”
127   
 
“For the present purposes, it suffices to say, that, in some of the cases, there was 
evidence, of the presence of Palestinian armed groups in residential areas.”
128  
 
The very language indicates bias.  The Mission only “believes” that there are 
“indications” of firing from urban areas.  It only “suffices to say” that “in some of the 
cases” there “was evidence.”  Compare this language to conclusions regarding Israeli 
actions where the Mission noted that there was “no doubt” of Israeli intentions and that 
the Mission’s conclusions were “firmly based in fact.”
129   The reality is that there is far 
more conclusive, self proving and undisputed evidence that “Palestinian armed groups 
launched rockets from urban areas” than that it was the policy of Israel to kill civilians.  
But a reader would not know that from reading the carefully selected words of the report.   
 
Before moving on to discuss the actions of militants in schools, mosques, and around 
hospitals, let us first pause to describe the actual nature of militant operations in 
residential areas.  The hard evidence is incontrovertible that at every point of the conflict, 
Gaza militants consistently used residential and urban areas to launch attacks and to store 
their weapons, gravely endangering the lives of nearby Palestinian civilians.  Here is 
what Amnesty International, certainly no friend of Israel, wrote about Hamas tactics: 
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“Hamas and other groups generally store weapons in civilian areas and there is no reason 
to believe that it was any different during Operation ‘Cast Lead’.  By doing so, it 
rendered such locations possible targets of attack and therefore exposed civilians who 
may have been present to risk.”
130  The Los Angeles Times reported that during 
Operation Cast Lead “even many purely civilian neighborhoods aren’t safe because Gaza 
militants often fire rockets from such areas….”
131   
 
There is specific photographic and video evidence of Hamas forces using residential 
areas as staging grounds for attacks.  The IDF posted a January 8, 2009 aerial video of a 
militant setting an improvised explosive device and then climbing into a house where, 
when approached by the IDF, civilians began waving white flags.
132  Other videos show: 
on December 30, 2008 Israeli forces destroying smuggling tunnels in the immediate 
vicinity of homes, with multiple secondary explosions indicating presence of rockets;
133 
on January 6, 2009, a house struck by Israeli fire, followed by multiple secondary 
explosions, indicating storage of hidden rockets, and an armed rocket launcher located 
between homes;
134 and on January 7, 2009, an anti aircraft gun positioned on a civilian 
building and a mortar being fired from a residential rooftop. 
135  The IDF also posted 
photos showing an underground rocket launch pad located in a residential area
136 and 
weapons, including grenades, stored in a house during Operation Cast Lead.
137  The 
Israeli NGO Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center has published a report 
documenting even more photographic evidence of residences being used to store, fire, 
and manufacture weapons.
138  A video from Al Aqsa TV on January 6, 2009 clearly 
shows men firing mortars from a civilian area in Gaza.
139  Here are two photographs 
showing rockets fired from densely populated areas during Operation Cast Lead.
140 
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Palestinian witnesses confirm Hamas militants operating in residential areas.  The 
Washington Post relayed the harrowing story of the Abu Nihil family: 
 
“The [Abu Nihil] house sits next to a small sports stadium, favored by Hamas 
fighters as a place to launch rockets.  So it was not a big surprise when Israeli 
warplanes fired missiles at the stadium after midnight on Dec. 29.  For some 
reason, the first two missiles crashed into the stadium but did not explode, 
members of the family recalled.  Still wearing their pajamas, parents and 
grandparents gathered the children and dashed outside.  They managed to get a 
few blocks away by the time another missile struck the stadium. This one 
detonated, as designed. ‘I looked back at the house,’ Tarik said. ‘It was on fire 
everywhere.’  The Abu Nihils kept walking until they reached a relative's house, 
about a mile away.  It was a difficult escape.  Tarik’s mother, Samira, 53, was 
recovering from a back operation and could barely move on her own.  His sister 
in law, Raja, 24, was eight months pregnant.”
141 
 
Bassam Zakarneh of the PA’s Workers’ Union said, “Hamas leaders… used these [1,400] 
martyrs as sandbags, while they hid in tunnels. They would place a missile, cover it with 
a tent, amid buildings with 200 children and old people, and they would launch the 
missile and hide.”
142 
 
Newsweek reported that on January 17, 20009 at 11:30pm in the Nuseirat refugee camp, 
one of “Hamas's homemade Qassam rockets [was] launched into Israel—and the mobile 
launchpad was smack in the middle of the four buildings, where every apartment was 
full, most of them with newly made refugees.”
143  A German paper tells the story of 
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Mohammed Sadala of Beit Lahia, whose home was used by Hamas during the fighting 
and then targeted by Israeli forces.  When Sadala returned home after the fighting ended, 
he found the corpses of two Hamas fighters killed by Israel.  In another civilian’s home, 
militants had left a rocket launcher, assault rifle, and an ammunitions belt. “The[y, 
Hamas,] abused civilians’ homes for their own purposes. That is not right,” the 
anonymous civilian said.
144  According to a New York Times report during Operation 
Cast Lead, “Shireen Shihab, 30, a resident of Gaza City, said Monday that she had seen 
Hamas fighters firing rockets toward Israel from a site two blocks away from her 
home.”
145  Here is what a Palestinian source, quoted in the New York Times, said:  
 
“This time it was different…they have more experience and they have training 
from Syria and Iran.  They helped them rethink their strategy.  They fired rockets 
in between the houses and covered the alleys with sheets so they could set the 
rockets up in five minutes without the planes seeing them.  The moment they 
fired, they escaped, and they are very quick.”
146 
 
The Goldstone Report accuses Israeli soldiers of intentionally singling out civilians for 
death during the Abed Raboo incident and determined that “the Israeli armed forces were 
not engaged in combat or fearing an attack at the time of the incident.”
 147 Yet here is 
what a Time reporter wrote, “Most residents of Jebel al Kashif claim there were no 
Hamas fighters in the area at the time of the alleged incident [Abed Raboo], but a middle 
aged farmer in a battered army jacket took me aside and said, in a near whisper, that 
Hamas had been firing rockets from the vicinity of where the episode took place.”
148 
 
Here is what Italian reporter Lorenzo Cremonesi reported about the situation during 
Operation Cast Lead: 
 
“‘Get away! Get away from here! Do you want the Israelis to kill everyone? Do you 
want our children to die under the bombs? Take your missiles and weapons away,’ the 
inhabitants of the Gaza Strip yelled at the Hamas militants and their allies in Islamic 
Jihad. The more courageous were organized and blocked the entrances to their 
courtyards and locked the doors to their buildings, barricading quickly and furiously 
the stairs to the highest rooftops. But for all of that the guerrillas didn’t listen to 
anyone. ‘Traitors, collaborators with Israel, spies of Fatah, cowards! The soldiers of 
the holy war will punish you.  And in any case you will all die, like us. Fighting the 
Zionist Jews we are all destined for paradise.  Do you not wish to die with us?’” 
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“This is what they yelled furiously as they broke down doors and windows, hiding 
themselves on high floors, gardens, using ambulances and barricading themselves near 
the hospitals, schools and buildings of the UN.  In extreme cases the [Hamas militants] 
shot those who sought to block them from their streets and houses to save their own 
families, or they beat them savagely.”
 149 
 
Cremonesi also reported that two Gaza residents told him, “The Hamas militants looked 
for good places to provoke the Israelis.  They were usually youths, 16 or 17 years old, 
armed with submachine guns.  They couldn’t do anything against a tank or jet. They 
knew they were much weaker.  But they wanted the [Israelis] to shoot at the [the 
civilians’] houses so they could accuse them of more war crimes.” 
150  Cremonesi 
explained, “It was difficult to get these testimonials.  In general, fear of Hamas prevails 
and ideological taboos, fed by this century of wars with the ‘Zionist enemy,’ reign. 
Anyone who tells a different version than the story imposed by the Muhamawa 
(resistance), is automatically an Amil (collaborator), and risks his life.”
151 
An Islamic Jihad newspaper boasts: 
   
“There is no visibility of the men of the resistance in the streets of the [Gaza] 
strip.  No one sees their known means of transportation, and even light weapons 
can no longer be seen with people publicly in the Gaza Strip.  The resistance is 
totally even as its actions are felt.  Anti aircraft artillery fires on the aircraft 
without them knowing the location.  The whereabouts of rockets launched from 
the heart of the strip cannot be seen or known until they're shot.... The residents of 
the Gaza Strip were surprised with the rockets of the resistance being fired from 
the heart of the cities of the Gaza Strip, without seeing how the launchers were 
put up, or their place, in order for deception to prevent exposure to the Israeli 
intelligence planes of the place of the firing of the rockets.... According to 
medical sources, the number of martyrs and wounded of the warriors of the 
Palestinian resistance are few in comparison to the number of civilian martyrs 
who were killed since the start of the Israeli war on Gaza, except for the large 
number of Palestinian policemen who were martyred on the first day....”
152 
 
The evidence is clear and incontrovertible.  In light of the evidence, how can the report 
possibly express in such halfhearted terms that there merely “are indications” Hamas 
used residential areas to fire rockets at Israeli civilians?   
 
B.  Militant Activity in Schools and Hospitals 
 
Although half heartedly accepting the possibility that militants may have fired from 
“urban areas,” and around hospitals, the report does not credit a clear pattern of militants 
using schools to launch attacks and store rockets.  The report also ignores evidence that 
hospitals may have been used for military purposes. 
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With regard to schools, “[T]he Mission accepted, on the basis of information in the 
reports that it had seen, the possibility of mortar attacks from Palestinian combatants in 
the vicinity of the [Jabilya] school.”
153  In another part of the report, the Mission writes 
“The Mission notes that the [IDF] attack [near the school] may have been in response to a 
mortar attack from an armed Palestinian group but considers the credibility of Israel’s 
position damaged by the series of inconsistencies and factual inaccuracies.”
154  The hard 
evidence shows that there were indeed militants in the vicinity of the Jabilya school.  For 
instance, “Two residents of the area who spoke to the Associated Press by telephone said 
they saw a handful of militants firing mortar shells from a street near the school.”
155 
Another reporter claims “Local residents in the street told me that militants had been 
firing rockets [near the school] ― as the IDF claimed — and having been targeted in 
retaliatory fire by the IDF, they ran down the street past the school.”
156  The New York 
Times reported, “Witnesses, including Hanan Abu Khajib, 39, said that Hamas fired just 
outside the school compound, probably from the secluded courtyard of a house across the 
street, 25 yards from the school.  Israeli return fire, some minutes later, also landed 
outside the school, along the southwest wall, killing two Hamas fighters.”
157Although 
two of these three sources are cited in the report, little credence is granted to them 
because, according to the interviews the Mission conducted, “No witness stated that he 
had heard any firing prior to the Israeli armed forces’ mortars landing.”
158 Recall, 
however, that the Mission was accompanied by Hamas security, and that civilians who 
spoke out against the Hamas party line likely feared reprisal. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the report does not address Hamas’ clear pattern of using schools to 
launch attacks.  It makes a single mention of a rocket fired from a school.
159  The IDF has 
posted video or photographic evidence showing:  on January 6, 2009, the presence of an 
anti tank missile in a school yard in Sajalya;
 160 on January 8, 2009, during the 
humanitarian ceasefire, three militants arming a rocket launcher in a school courtyard;
161 
and on January 11, 2009, a booby trapped school and zoo rigged with explosives.
162  The 
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IDF has also released aerial intelligence photographs locating a Hamas military camp 
approximately 27 meters from a school in the Northern Gaza Strip.
163 A particularly clear 
video shows a rocket launcher positioned between two schools on January 18, 2009. 
164 
Here is a sequence from the film: 
 
                                                 
 
The historical record prior to Operation Cast Lead is replete with incidents of militants 
using schools.  One of the most damning videos shows militants firing three mortar shells 
from an UNRWA school on Oct. 29, 2007.
165 
 
In terms of medical facilities, the report concludes, “On the basis of the investigations it 
has conducted, the Mission did not find any evidence to support the allegations that 
hospital facilities were used by the Gaza authorities or by Palestinian armed groups to 
shield military activities and that ambulances were used to transport combatants or for 
other military purposes.”
166  How can the Mission claim that there is no evidence for the 
proposition that hospitals were not used by Hamas?  The New York Times, in graphic 
terms, reported that armed militants in civilian clothes were present in the Shifa Hospital, 
summarily executing at least six civilians accused of collaboration.   Even the Palestinian 
Authority’s Ministry of Health accused Hamas of “use[ing] the medical centers, 
especially in a number of hospitals, [and] converting them into centers for interrogation, 
torture, and imprisonment.” 
167 
 
The Mission, even though it is in possession of a Newsweek article suggesting otherwise, 
does not make factual findings whether there were militants operating in the vicinity of 
the Al Quds hospital when it was attacked by Israeli forces.
168  The Newsweek article 
reports, “In the Tal al Hawa neighborhood nearby, however, Talal Safadi, an official in 
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the leftist Palestinian People's Party, said that resistance fighters were firing from 
positions all around the [Al Quds] hospital.”
169  
 
The Israeli government alleged,
170 with at least some independent support,
171 that Hamas 
occupied portions of Shifa hospital during Operation Cast Lead.  Israel contends that the 
hospital served as Hamas’ “main base of operations.”
172  The Mission is aware of this 
allegation but “did not investigate the case of al Shifa hospital and is not in a position to 
make any findings with regard to these allegations.”
173 Why does the Mission avoid 
investigating one of Israel’s most serious allegations?  After all, hospitals have been used 
in the past for military purposes.  In 2007, an official from the International Committee of 
the Red Cross told an Australian radio show, “[W]e have noticed many armed people 
present inside the medical and surgical wards where even their presence have been 
disturbing the medical teams and frightening the patients who are treated at these 
hospitals.  In one hospital in Biet Hanoun the hospital is out of functioning as militants 
sent all the medical staff home the day before yesterday causing the Hospital to stop 
serving the whole population of Biet Hanoun.”
174 
 
The report notes the accusation that militants may have attempted to hijack ambulances, 
but quickly dismisses it as “the exception, not the rule.”
175  In acknowledging this claim, 
the report cites to an article in which an ambulance driver says militants “ordered me to 
get them out, to put them in the ambulance and take them away….And then one of the 
fighters picked up a gun and held it to my head, to force me.”
176  
 
  C. Militant Activity in Mosques 
 
The report’s conclusion regarding mosques is also contradicted by hard evidence.  
Although the Mission possessed evidence indicating mosques were used for military 
purposes,
177 they conclude, “The Mission is unable to make any determination on the 
general allegation that Palestinian armed groups used mosques for military purposes.”
178  
This is willful blindness, or worse, on the Mission’s part.  By their own admission, the 
Mission investigated only one instance in which the Israelis alleged mosques were used 
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for military purposes.
179  Had they been interested in the truth, surely the Mission would 
have performed more investigations, or at the very least read credible news accounts 
indicating militant use of mosques. 
 
The hard evidence, had the Mission wished to credit it, proves not only that mosques 
were used to store weapons, but that they also served as launching grounds for rocket 
attacks.  The New York Times reported, “Hamas fighters are also putting civilians at 
undue risk by storing weapons among them, including in mosques [and] schools.…”
180 
The Los Angeles Times reported, “Every day, the Hamas rocket teams sneak through the 
fire and fury of Gaza to launching sites such as trucks, rooftops, school courtyards and 
mosques.”
181 The Washington Post wrote, “Ordinarily secure places have become risky. 
No one seeks sanctuary in the mosques, because Hamas fighters are known to store 
weapons there.”
182  These statements from reputable news organizations all referred to 
the events of Operation Cast Lead and are confirmed by hard evidence provided by the 
IDF.  Here is a video sequence showing a mortar fired from a Mosque on January 7, 
2009. 
183 
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As the camera zooms in, the minaret of the mosque is clearly visable in the picture on the 
bottom right.  Other video evidence shows secondary explosions erupting in two separate 
mosques after being hit by IDF fire on December 31, 2008 and January 1, 2009, 
indicating weapons were stored in the mosques.
184  The IDF also posted video and 
photographic evidence of soldiers searching a Zeiton mosque on January 13, 2009 and 
finding an anti aircraft cannon and rockets.
185  More IDF Photographs show an assault 
rifle and ammunition hidden inside a mosque pulpit on January 15, 2009.
186 On January 
22, 2009 The IDF posted an aerial map locating a rocket launching site approximately 18 
meters from a mosque in the Shaati refugee camp.
187  Another aerial IDF intelligence 
map shows Hamas activity among civilian homes, schools, hospitals and mosques in Tel 
Zaatar.
188  A particularly convincing piece of evidence is a seized Hamas intelligence 
map, posted on the IDF website, showing placement of improvised explosive devices 
directly next to civilian areas and sniper positions next to mosques.
189  
 
The report’s conclusions that ignore all this evidence is not surprising, considering what 
one of its members, Colonel Travers said, namely that the accusation that Hamas uses 
mosques to store ammunition “reflects western perceptions, in some quarters that Islam is 
a violent religion.”  In other words, “political correctness” must trump hard evidence.  As 
Groucho Marx once put it: “Who are you going to believe, me? Or your lying eyes?”  Or 
in the present context, “my political bias or your lying videos?” 
 
  D. Militant Uniforms 
 
It is widely accepted that Hamas militants often do not wear uniforms or proper insignia 
when attacking Israeli forces.  It should come as a surprise then that “The Mission found 
no evidence that members of Palestinian armed groups engaged in combat in civilian 
dress.”
190  Again, the hard evidence contradicts the report’s conclusion.  The New York 
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Times noted during Operation Cast Lead that Hamas militants fought “in the midst of 
civilians, often in civilian clothing.”
191  ‘Mohammed,’ a member of the Izz al Din al 
Qassam Brigades told The Times of London that fighters wore civilian clothes during 
military activities.
192  The Chicago Tribune reported, “The Israeli offensive to halt Hamas 
rocket attacks pitted the military against gunmen fighting among civilians, often in 
civilian clothes themselves….”
193A video from Al Aqsa TV on January 6, 2009 clearly 
shows men dressed in civilian clothes firing mortars.
194  When an NPR host asked an Al 
Jazeera reporter in Gaza City whether people would be able to distinguish militant aged 
civilians and actual militants, he responded, “Certainly not.  The short answer to that is 
no.  You cannot distinguish because if you were just going to base it on looks, since the 
first day of the attacks, we know that a lot of the services here, the police services as well 
as the military factions, are not dressing in particularly identifiable uniforms.  They may 
have done on the first couple of days, but there is no clear identifiable marker to say 
someone is a civilian or someone is not.”
195 Talal Abu Ramah told CNN, “Now Hamas, 
they are under cover, all of them they are civilians now, you don’t see any militants 
around you, even the cars…I don’t know if the car in front of me or in the back of me, if 
it’s a target or not.”
196 Once again the report’s conclusion flies in the face of the clear and 
incontrovertible evidence. How can the members possibly explain these contradictions, 
which should be obvious to all?   
 
  E. Directing Civilians to Areas to Shield Military Objectives from Attack 
 
One of the most serious charges against Hamas is that they directed or forced civilians to 
shield military objectives from attack, in violation of international humanitarian law.  
Despite hard evidence of this, “On the basis of the information it gathered, the Mission 
found no indication that the civilian population was forced by Hamas or Palestinian 
armed groups to remain in areas under attack from the Israeli armed forces.”
197  Here 
again, the hard evidence points to the opposite conclusion.  It proves conclusively that 
some civilians volunteered, some were coerced and others were forced to serve as human 
shields.   
 
To begin, the evidence demonstrates a pattern of directing civilians into harm’s way prior 
to Operation Cast Lead.  For instance, in early November 2006, a group of militants in a 
mosque were under siege by Israeli forces.  A Hamas radio station brazenly called on 
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Gaza women to serve as “human shields” for the militants, which many willingly did.
198  
On Nov. 20, 2006, Israeli forces called Hamas operative Wael Rajab to warn him that his 
home would be destroyed.  According to the Jerusalem Post, civilians “flocked” to 
Rajab’s home to serve as human shields and prevent the strike.
199  A similar incident 
occurred on Nov. 18, 2006 when the head of the Popular Resistance Committees’ qassam 
division Mohammedweil Baroud received warning his house would be destroyed.
 200  
After Baroud rushed to a mosque to gather human shields, hundreds of people, including 
women and children, surrounded the house to prevent the Israeli strike.
201  Before these 
two incidents, a Hamas preacher said, “Instead of running away, the owners [of 
threatened houses] must stay inside their homes and call the neighbors and as many 
people as possible.  The human shields are the best way to protect the houses.”
202 Abu 
Mujahed, spokesperson for the Popular Resistance Committees insisted “From now on 
we will form human chains around every house that is threatened with demolition.”
203   
 
Even though the report claims that “No such incidents [of forcing/directing human 
shields] are alleged by the Israeli Government with regard to the military operations that 
began on 27 December 2008 [and t]he Mission received no reports of such incidents from 
other sources,”
204 a simple news search reveals hard evidence that Hamas did indeed 
direct and force human shields during Operation Cast Lead.  The Times of London tells 
the story of a Palestinian whose roof was scouted by militants as a sniper position prior to 
the operation. When fighting began, he was told by militants he was “part of the 
resistance” and was forced to serve as a human shield.  The civilian recalls,  
 
“They were resistance fighters.  I did not want them there but they made it clear 
that this is where they would set up their positions.  I went downstairs to wake my 
wife to tell her we would go to her sisters’. But they stopped us.  [The militants 
said, ‘]If soldiers come, you must send your children to warn us.  Tell them there 
is no one here and we will escape somewhere else.[ ’] They would not listen when 
I told them to let my youngest children go, my family.  They said no, it must look 
normal.”
205   
 
Wafa Kannan, of Gaza City, was lucky.  The Knight Ridder wire service reported her 
story: 
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“In an apartment building across the street from Kannan and her family live four 
brothers who are Hamas militants.  Israeli intelligence called the Hamas members 
to warn them that they were targets, Kannan said.  Leaders at the local mosque 
urged neighbors to converge on the apartment building and act as human shields, 
she added.  No one heeded the call, however, so the Hamas militants fled.”
206 
 
The IDF has posted video evidence of civilians being forced or directed to serve as 
human shields during Operation Cast Lead.   One video shows a militant launching a 
rocket from the roof of a home and then being escorted out by civilians.
207  Another video 
shows a fleeing militant attempting to maneuver himself next to civilians so as to shield 
himself from attack.
208  Yet this evidence, and much more, was ignored by the report. 
 
  F. Intent 
 
The central issue that distinguishes the conclusions of the Goldstone Report regarding 
Israel and Hamas is intentionality.  The report finds that the most serious accusation 
against Israel, namely the killing of civilians, was intentional (and deliberately planned at 
the highest levels).  The report also finds that one of the most serious accusations made 
against Hamas, namely that their combatants wore civilian clothing to shield themselves 
from attack, mingled among the civilian populations and used civilians as human shields, 
was unintentional.   
 
It must be pointed out, to begin with, that the issue of Hamas’ intentions and actions with 
regard to the civilian shield issue is not unrelated to the issue of the IDF’s intentions and 
actions with regard to the deaths of Palestinian civilians.  If it were to turn out that there 
was no evidence that Hamas ever operated from civilians areas, and that the IDF knew 
this, then the allegation that the IDF, by firing into civilian areas, deliberately intended to 
kill Palestinian civilians, would be strengthened.  But if it were to turn out that the IDF 
reasonably believed that Hamas fighters were deliberately using civilians as shields, then 
this fact would weaken the claim that the IDF had no military purpose in firing into 
civilian areas.  It would also undercut the conclusion that Israel’s  real intention could be 
nothing other than its desire to kill Palestinian civilians.  Moreover, if Hamas did use 
human shields then the deaths of Palestinian civilians would be more justly attributable to 
Hamas then to Israel.   
 
Since intentionality, or lack thereof, was so important to the report’s conclusions, it 
would seem essential that the report would apply the same evidentiary standards, rules 
and criteria in determining the intent of Israel and in determining the intent of Hamas.  
Yet a careful review of the report makes it crystal clear that its writers applied totally 
different standards, rules and criteria in evaluating the intent of the parties to the conflict.  
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The report resolved doubts against Israel in concluding that its leaders intended to kill 
civilians, while resolving doubts in favor of Hamas in concluding that it did not intend to 
use Palestinian civilians as human shields.  Moreover, when it had precisely the same sort 
of evidence in relation to both sides—for example, statements by leaders prior to the 
commencement of the operation—it attributed significant weight to the Israeli statements, 
while entirely discounting comparable Hamas statements.  This sort of evidentiary bias, 
though subtle, and perhaps not readily apparent to the non legal reader, permeates the 
entire report.   
 
In addition to the statements of leaders, which are treated so differently, the report takes a 
completely different view regarding the inferring of intent from actions.  When it comes 
to Israel, the report repeatedly looks to results and infers from the results that they must 
have been intended.  But when it comes to Hamas, it refuses to draw inferences regarding 
intent from results.  For example, it acknowledges that some combatants wore civilian 
clothes, and it offers no reasonable explanation for why this would be so other than to 
mingle indistinguishably from civilians.  Yet it refuses to infer intent from these actions.  
This is crucial because the violation of international humanitarian law known as human 
shield use requires specific intent.
209  For Hamas to be guilty of using human shields, 
militants not only needed to know that when they fired rockets from civilian areas, Israel 
was deterred from responding, but it must have been their purpose in shooting the rockets 
from civilian areas to deter Israel from responding or to cause Israel to kill civilians.  
Although the Mission, as discussed above, half heartedly concludes that militants fired 
rockets from civilian areas, they refuse to believe that this was done with the purpose of 
rendering such areas immune from attack.  Here are the report’s words: “On the basis of 
the information it gathered, the Mission finds that there are indications that Palestinian 
armed groups launched rockets from urban areas.  The Mission has not been able to 
obtain any direct evidence that this was done with the specific intent of shielding the 
rocket launchers from counterattacks by the Israeli armed forces.”
210  Notice the use of 
the words direct evidence.  As discussed in section I above, the report used five 
categories of evidence to conclude Israel had a policy of intentionally killing civilians: 
military leader statements, political leader statements, circumstance (Israel’s use of 
advanced weaponry ), result (the sheer number of civilian deaths), and alleged related 
actions (destruction of infrastructure).  None of these categories constitute direct evidence 
of intent. The report does not explain why it requires direct evidence to infer Hamas 
intent but is content to rely on extremely weak circumstantial evidence to infer Israeli 
intent.   
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The Mission was in possession of Hamas statements that strongly suggested intent, but 
refused to credit them.  As described in section I of this paper, the report quoted a Hamas 
political leader who said, “For the Palestinian people, death has become an industry, at 
which women excel, and so do all the people living on this land….This is why they have 
formed human shields of the women, the children, the elderly, and the mujahideen, in 
order to challenge the Zionist bombing machine.”
211  The Mission responded that the “it 
does not consider it [the quote] to constitute evidence that Hamas forced Palestinian 
civilians to shield military objectives against attack.”
212  This statement is used in the 
section of the report investigating whether militants forced civilians to go to certain areas 
for the purpose of providing cover.  This is a distinct inquiry from whether militants had 
the specific intent of shielding themselves when operating in areas that happened to be 
occupied by civilians.  The quote is certainly relevant to this later inquiry, as it tends to 
show the Hamas ideology that using human shields is not only permitted, but admirable.   
Nonetheless, the report refuses to infer intent on the basis of this statement.  
 
The Mission is also in possession of another statement from a Palestinian militant that 
suggests intent.  The fighter’s paraphrased words were that he launched attacks from 
civilian areas “in the hope that nearby civilians would deter Israel from responding.”
213  
Unlike any of the statements made by Israeli officials discussed in section I, this 
statement actually is direct evidence of intent.  Astonishingly, the report does not credit 
the statement because another fighter said, “[T]he most important thing is achieving our 
military goals. We stay away from the houses if we can, but that’s often impossible.”
214  
The Mission found that this quote “suggests the absence of intent.”
215  The report does 
not even consider that some fighters possessed the requisite intent and others did not, or 
that some were just towing the party line when speaking with investigators.  Instead, it 
uses the statement of the second militant to discredit the statement of the first militant.  
There were of course many comparable statements by Israeli officials that could have 
been used to impeach the ones selected by the report.  It is telling of the Mission’s bias 
that the report goes so far to present a balanced view of Hamas militants but selects for 
publication only the most hyperbolic and extreme statements of Israeli political officials. 
 
Highly relevant to the report’s conclusion that militants did not intend for their actions to 
shield themselves from counterattack is that the Mission was “unable to make any 
determination on the general allegation that Palestinian armed groups used mosques for 
military purpose,”
216 “did not find any evidence to support the allegations that hospital 
facilities were used by the Gaza authorities or by Palestinian armed groups to shield 
military activities,”
217  did not find evidence “that ambulances were used to transport 
combatants or for other military purposes,”
218 and did not find “that Palestinian armed 
groups engaged in combat actives from United Nations facilities that were used as 
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shelters during the military operations.”
219  As discussed above, however, there is hard 
evidence that Hamas did operate in mosques and, at the very least, near hospitals.  
Evidence of circumstance (precise weaponry) was used to prove Israeli intent.  Regarding 
Hamas, the evidence of circumstance is even stronger in inferring intent.  It is beyond 
obvious that militants do not fire rockets in the vicinity of mosques or hospitals because it 
is easier to launch rockets near community institutions.  Rather, they do so only because 
of the special protections afforded to hospitals and religious centers in war.  The only 
purpose in firing from these facilities is to shield militants from counter attack.  There 
simply is no other explanation.   
 
In refusing to conclude that Hamas operated in mosques and hospitals during Operation 
Cast Lead, the Mission discounted photographic and video evidence on the basis that it 
“refer[s] not to the December 2008 January 2009 period, but to previous alleged 
instances of firing rockets from Gaza.”
220  Dismissing evidence prior to Operation Cast 
Lead is the modus operandi to the Mission when it comes to Hamas.  In determining that 
Hamas did not direct civilians to areas to shield military objectives from attack, the report 
also dismisses clear evidence in its possession that Hamas directed civilians to areas to 
shield military objectives from attack in 2007.  Because the event did not occur during 
Operation Cast Lead, the Mission deemed it utterly irrelevant.
 221  There are numerous 
problems with this misuse of evidence.  In the first place, the report placed great weight 
on hyperbolic statements made by Israeli military officials years before Operation Cast 
Lead.  Many of them were made in the context of the very different war fought against 
Hezbollah in Lebanon during 2006.  Second, and even more important, is the fact that 
Israel’s military planning, which the report focuses on, took place well in advance of the 
commencement of Operation Cast Lead.  It is highly relevant to the intention of Israeli 
planners that they have hard video, photographic and testimonial evidence of Hamas 
fighters firing rockets from behind human shields.  Even if no rockets were fired from 
behind human shields during Operation Cast Lead—an absurd conclusion contradicted by 
massive evidence—it would still be relevant to Israel’s intentions that the planners were 
aware of Hamas’ long term modus operandi:  namely, to fire their rockets from behind 
human shields in densely populated civilian areas.  Further, past actions would be 
important for inferring the intentions of Hamas.  It is reasonable to suppose that militant 
mental state does not change over time vis à vis launching attacks from civilian areas.  If 
militants were willing to fire from a mosque or behind a forced civilian shield two years 
earlier to avoid counterattack, it is likely that when they later fire rockets from residential 
areas, that are doing so to shield themselves from counterattack.   
 
This study ends with refusal to infer intent that is most absurd and therefore most telling 
of the report’s bias.  The Mission wrote, “While reports reviewed by the Mission credibly 
indicate that members of Palestinian armed groups were not always dressed in a way that 
distinguished them from civilians, the Mission found no evidence that Palestinian 
combatants mingled with the civilian population with the intention of shielding 
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themselves from attack.”
222  Prof. Halbertal succinctly disposes of this maddening 
reasoning: “The reader of such a sentence might well wonder what its author means. Did 
Hamas militants not wear their uniforms because they were inconveniently at the 
laundry? What other reasons for wearing civilian clothes could they have had, if not for 
deliberately sheltering themselves among the civilians?”
223 The report does not address 
this question, because if it did, it would have had to reach a conclusion that would have 
undercut the basic thrust of the report:  namely that Israel deliberately shot at civilians, 
rather than at terrorists who deliberately wore civilian clothing and hid among the civilian 
population. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION: A WASTED OPPORTUNITY AND A BIASED REPORT 
 
There are six possible roles that an investigative commission could have performed.  
Each requires different qualifications and levels of neutrality.  
 
1.  To gather evidence of all possible allegations and accusations leveled by each side 
against the other.  No effort is made to evaluate the credibility of these 
allegations.  The sole function is to gather the accusations and make them public 
so that the other side can respond.  To conduct such an evidence gathering 
investigation requires that the investigators have the trust of those who they are 
interviewing.  It also requires a degree of neutrality in making certain that a fair 
sampling of accusations is gathered and that the information is not skewed in one 
way or another. 
 
2.  To assess the credibility of those making the accusations.  This requires cross 
examination of the accusers and subjecting the accusations to crosschecking 
against other evidence.  It also requires that those evaluating credibility be 
absolutely neutral and objective and have no predisposition to believing one side 
over the other.   
 
3.  To gather evidence of the intentions of the various actors.  This is an extremely 
difficult task that requires access to statements both public and private of both 
sides.  This function does not require assessment of credibility of the evidence but 
rather merely its gathering to present publicly so that the other side can respond. 
 
4.  To assess the credibility of evidence regarding intent and to arrive at conclusions.  
This too requires absolute neutrality and objectivity.  
 
5.  To make legal findings regarding the actions and intentions of both sides.  This 
requires sophisticated legal expertise and experience.   
 
6.  To make an overall political assessment of the nature of the conflict, its history 
and its current status.  This requires historical and diplomatic expertise and 
neutrality.   
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Had the Goldstone report limited itself to the first function—gathering testimony and 
physical evidence of the actions of both sides without assessing credibility—it would 
have performed a useful function.  The factual allegations in the report include serious 
charges against both sides that require serious investigations and responses.  The Israeli 
military is undertaking precisely such an investigation, and I hope there will be an 
independent civilian investigation as well.  There is no likelihood that Hamas will 
conduct any credible inquiry, since it has no history of, or process for, doing so.   
 
The report goes well beyond simply gathering testimonies.  It purports to assess 
credibility, determine intentions and arrive at both legal and political conclusions.  The 
members of this commission not only lack the expertise to engage in these latter 
assessments, but even more important they lack the neutrality and objectivity.  As 
Goldstone himself has acknowledged, if this were a court of law, “there would have been 
nothing proven,”
 224 and at least one of its members would have been disqualified as a 
result of pre existing bias. 
 
Beyond its limited function of gathering testimonies from residents of Gaza, the 
Goldstone mission represents a wasted opportunity for an objective group of real experts 
to consider the difficult moral, military, political and legal issues presented by the 
situation in Gaza.  The report, commissioned by an organization with a long history of 
anti Israel bigotry, and written by biased “experts,” with limited experience and a pre 
ordained result, is one sided and wrong in its fundamental conclusions.  This should not 
be surprising since conclusions can be no better than the methodology employed, and the 
methodology employed in this report is fundamentally flawed.
226 
 
So now it is up to Richard Goldstone to explain the evidentiary bias that is so obviously 
reflected in the report.  The burden is on him to justify the very different methodologies 
used in the report to arrive at its conclusions regarding the intentions of Israel and the 
intentions of Hamas.  Failure to assume that burden will constitute an implicit admission 
that the conclusions reached in the Goldstone Report are not worthy of consideration by 
people of good will.  I await his response. 
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